Electoral Reform and Trade-Offs in Representation by Becher, Michael & Menendez, Irene
Electoral Reform and Trade-Offs in Representation
Michael Becher∗ Irene Mene´ndez Gonza´lez†
January 26, 2019‡
Conditionally accepted at the American Political Science Review
Abstract
We examine the effect of electoral institutions on two important features of rep-
resentation that are often studied separately: policy responsiveness and the quality
of legislators. Theoretically, we show that while a proportional electoral system is
better than a majoritarian one at representing popular preferences in some contexts,
this advantage can come at the price of undermining the selection of good politicians.
To empirically assess the relevance of this trade-off, we analyze an unusually con-
trolled electoral reform in Switzerland early in the twentieth century. To account for
endogeneity, we exploit variation in the intensive margin of the reform, which intro-
duced proportional representation, based on administrative constraints and data on
voter preferences. A difference-in-difference analysis finds that higher reform intensity
increases the policy congruence between legislators and the electorate and reduces leg-
islative effort. Contemporary evidence from the European Parliament supports this
conclusion.
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One of the most sustained and controversial debates in political science concerns the ef-
fects of electoral systems on political representation (Htun and Powell, 2013). In a classical
contribution, John Stuart Mill (1861, ch. 7) argues that electoral systems based on propor-
tional representation (PR) perform better than majoritarian electoral systems on multiple
dimensions of democratic governance. Apart from leading to a more proportional weight
of minority groups in parliament, PR is also supposed to achieve two other crucial goals of
democracy. First, a policy passed by parliament should usually not run against the wishes of
a majority of the national electorate. Collective decision making requires choosing a single
policy from a set of contested options, and recent research uses policy-based representa-
tion of the national median voter, henceforth called policy responsiveness, as one important
criterion for evaluating electoral institutions (Cox 1997, 226; Powell and Vanberg 2000).
Second, elections should help to select good politicians. Complementing the importance of
electoral incentives, a large body of scholarship emphasizes that the quality of politicians
is also crucial for representation (Besley, 2006; Mansbridge, 2009). Complete and binding
contracts for legislators are unfeasible, and standard theories of accountability demonstrate
that elections cannot prevent rent-seeking by purely extrinsically motivated politicians even
if all citizens are informed, rational and vote (Ferejohn, 1986). More free-riding and more
corruption occurs when legislators lack intrinsic motivation (or civic virtue) to do their job.
While it would be theoretically intriguing and extremely useful if, as Mill (1861) argues,
one set of electoral rules promoted both policy representation and positive political selec-
tion, the large literature on the effects of electoral institutions of the last decades offers a
contradictory and incomplete picture. It has produced impressive models and a wealth of
data. Nonetheless, there remain deep disagreements as well as theoretical blind spots, and
formidable empirical challenges limit scholars’ ability to draw causal conclusions about the
promise of electoral reform.
On the one hand, many theoretical accounts share the notion that the choice of electoral
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institutions requires trade-offs between different goals. In particular, PR is often thought to
favor broad-based social representation at the expense of government accountability (Carey
and Hix, 2011; Persson and Tabellini, 2003; Powell, 2000), or collective at the expense of
individual representation (Carey and Shugart, 1995).
On the other hand, the claim that PR leads to more policy responsiveness to the national
electorate is fiercely contested. While it is clear that PR reduces votes-seats disproportion-
ality, canonical spatial models suggest that high policy responsiveness can also occur under
majoritarian systems (Cox 1997, 225-237; Downs 1957). Recent cross-national studies of the
ideological congruence between citizen and elected policymakers under alternative electoral
institutions have produced mixed findings (Blais and Bodet, 2006; Golder and Stramski,
2010; Powell, 2009; Powell and Vanberg, 2000) and they are explicitly not designed to iden-
tify causal effects of electoral reform (Powell, 2000, 43).
Moreover, we know fairly little about the effects of electoral rules on political selection.
Despite the long-standing recognition that the quality of politicians matters, most theories
of electoral institutions assume that politicians are perfectly exchangeable and their behav-
ior is solely determined by electoral incentives. An emergent literature is addressing this
topic (Beath et al., 2016; Galasso and Nannicini, 2017; Myerson, 1993; Shugart, Valdini and
Suominen, 2005). While far from reaching a consensus, several theories are closer to the
Millsian position that PR tends to select better politicians compared to its majoritarian
alternatives.
In this paper, we jointly examine the effects of electoral institutions on policy respon-
siveness and political selection. While existing institutional theories tend to focus on one of
these important dimensions of representation, we formalize a simple model to clarify how
electoral institutions may influence both. In contrast to classical arguments and several re-
cent theories, it highlights that, comparatively, PR is not necessarily good at supplying good
politicians. At the same time, depending on electoral geography, it facilitates the election
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of assemblies that enact policies in line with the median voter. We provide historical and
contemporary evidence consistent with this fundamental trade-off based on fine-grained data
on electoral reforms and the behavior of members of parliament (MPs).
We study two real-world electoral reforms that allow us to test micro-level implications
of the argument in an unusually controlled fashion. Our research design exploits the reforms’
intensive margin, focusing on exogenously varying changes in the magnitude of electoral dis-
tricts within the introduction of PR in a single legislative body. Electoral institutions them-
selves are political choices (Benoit, 2007; Boix, 1999; Leemann and Mares, 2014). Hence,
endogeneity, based on unobserved (by researchers) confounders or reverse causality, is a cen-
tral empirical challenge. As electoral reforms are relatively rare, most research has relied on
cross-national comparisons where finding credible sources of exogenous variation has proven
frustratingly elusive. If they occur, reforms are often bundled with other major changes.
To overcome these well-known obstacles, our main case studies the introduction of PR
in the Swiss canton of Zu¨rich early in the twentieth century. This reform has several attrac-
tive features. First, it is not bundled with other institutional changes. While at the time
many European countries debated whether to adopt PR, many reforms coincided with the
expansion of voting rights, changes in the form of government, or revolution (Duverger, 1954,
377).1 Second, the reform is introduced by referendum against the incumbent parliamentary
majority. This generates municipality-level data on mass support for institutional change,
capturing a key confounder omitted in most previous work. Third, the intensive margin of
the reform varies across districts based on pre-determined administrative constraints. Specif-
ically, there is heterogeneity in the increase of district magnitude (the number of legislators
elected in a district). This creates plausible treatment and control groups and offers the
opportunity to conduct a difference-in-difference analysis. Fourth, the institutional setting
generates micro-level data on the congruence between legislators and voters, drawn from
1Norway is another exception (Cox, Fiva and Smith, 2016).
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legislative and popular votes on the same policy. Previous research mainly uses left-right
scales of voter ideology and party positions, which are measured on different scales and do
not capture policy behavior (Powell and Vanberg, 2000, 411). Or it studies fiscal policy and
assumes that some spending categories better reflect mass preferences than others (Funk and
Gathmann, 2013; Persson and Tabellini, 2003). To tap into politicians’ quality understood
as intrinsic motivation, we measure their legislative effort.
We find robust evidence that districts exposed to a larger dosage of the reform experienced
a relative increase in the probability that MPs vote in line with the polity-wide median
voter but suffered a relative decline in legislative participation and speech-making. The
positive effect on policy responsiveness and the negative effect on the quality dimension
are of comparable size, suggesting that the adoption of PR involved a significant trade-
off. Moreover, we report results from an additional case showing that our argument is
also relevant for contemporary debates about electoral system design and representation.
Leveraging the introduction of PR for British members of the European Parliament, we find
on a large scale that a higher intensity of the reform leads to lower legislative effort and
higher shirking but a closer link between legislative votes and average citizen ideology.
Taken together, this paper communicates with several strands of scholarship on electoral
institutions and representation. First, it contributes to the debate on whether electoral insti-
tutions matter for the substantive congruence between citizen preferences and policymakers.
To surmount the lack of clear identification and measurement problems in cross-national
studies highlighted in the literature, we focus on variation within major electoral reforms
and provide credible evidence that PR can improve policy responsiveness, confirming a key
advantage.
Second, our model helps to address an important conceptual blind spot and contributes
to the nascent literature on constitutional design and political selection. In contrast to
Mill (1861) and several recent contributions (Beath et al., 2016; Galasso and Nannicini,
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2017; Myerson, 1993), our empirical analysis is consistent with the model’s proposition that
PR can reduce the quality of MPs. Altogether, reforms addressing the problem of biased
policy responsiveness can come at the price of undermining the selection of good politicians,
dashing the optimistic view painted by proponents of PR. Our model also identifies polity-
level context conditions under which the trade-off is most likely to emerge.
Third, we provide a new empirical strategy to address the problem of endogenous electoral
institutions. Researchers have turned to within-country variation in institutions to deal with
this issue. For instance, studies examining economic policy, turnout or legislators have
exploited variation in the adoption of PR across cantons (Funk and Gathmann, 2013), close
elections in mixed-member electoral systems (Gagliarducci, Nannicini and Naticchioni, 2011)
or population thresholds for municipal-level electoral systems (Eggers, 2015). Our strategy
exploits both variation in reform intensity and a direct measure of voters’ support for the
reform. In that sense, our results are doubly robust to endogeneity concerns. The main
methodological approach can also be applied to other electoral reforms and outcomes, like
party systems or gender equality.
Finally, this article’s focus is distinct from, and complementary to, personal vote theories
of electoral rules, which highlight how electoral rules shape the trade-off between individual
(local-level) and collective (party-based) representation. Most work in the voluminous liter-
ature focuses on constituency-oriented behavior (Carey and Shugart, 1995; Stratmann and
Baur, 2002). Recent scholarship also examines attributes of candidates, especially local-level
political experience and birthplace, that signal credibility as a local agent (Shugart, Valdini
and Suominen, 2005). In contrast, the quality of politicians in our framework is not specif-
ically local. This is reflected in our empirical measures, which capture general activities of
MPs that are essential for parliament to fulfill its function but may even undermine efforts
to build a personal vote (Høyland, Hobolt and Hix, 2017). Moreover, personal vote theories
do not make clear predictions about policy responsiveness (as defined here).
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Theoretical framework
Electoral institutions simultaneously influence the quality of MPs and the responsiveness
of parliamentary decisions to the national electorate, and institutional design can entail a
stark trade-off between these representational goals. Politicians in our framework are not
exchangeable. As in Myerson (1993) and related work, they vary both in their ideology (or
partisanship) and in their quality. While quality can have multiple interpretations, we em-
phasize the importance of intrinsic motivation to contribute to global parliamentary goods
and refrain from corruption (e.g., “character” in Besley 2006, “internally motivated” in Mans-
bridge 2011, or“moral virtue”in Mill 1861). Complementing electoral incentives, the intrinsic
motivation of politicians is important because essential functions of parliaments – delibera-
tion, lawmaking, or effectively overseeing other branches of government – require collective
efforts by MPs that are subject to free-riding problems and opportunities for shirking. Cit-
izens cannot constantly monitor MPs and electoral rewards for individual contributions are
usually low-powered.
As in standard spatial theories, there are disagreements between voters about policy
(e.g., taxes or regulation). Additionally, voters have a shared interest in being represented
by good politicians on a “valence” dimension. To voters, the quality of politicians matters
for instrumental and non-instrumental reasons. It is an important input into the process
of parliamentary representation as well as instrumental in shaping outcomes. For instance,
input legitimacy and approval are higher when important collective decisions are taken after
debate and with the participation of more than a fraction of MPs; public policies, whatever
their ideological content, should be efficient; politicians should not misuse public funds or
accept bribes. All of this requires integrity and the motivation to work hard, and high-quality
(good) politicians exhibit more of that than low-quality ones.2
2Apart from local ties, quality thus defined is also distinct from other non-positional features, such as
being a sports star or television celebrity.
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To analyze potential trade-offs, we consider a society that consists of multiple groups of
citizens (e.g., defined by class or ethnicity). For each group, there is a potential political
party that can compete in the election by nominating candidates, drawing from a pool
of politicians with heterogenous quality but the same party label. Our analytical focus
is on comparing representation under two common electoral systems (Cox, 1997). First,
a majoritarian system (MR) where MPs are elected in single-member (or low-magnitude)
districts using an electoral formula such as plurality rule (MR). Second, a PR system in
which MPs are elected on party lists in larger (but not necessarily country-wide) districts.
Our theory highlights two related problems that can undermine political representation
and how they are addressed under alternative electoral rules. First, electoral geography can
undermine policy responsiveness. Under MR, the distribution of voter preferences in space
can lead to biased seats-votes representation and biased policy outcomes (Calvo and Rodden,
2015; Rodden, 2010). While electoral competition in majoritarian systems entails strong
centripetal incentives for parties to compete for the support of the median voter (Downs,
1957), this logic applies most clearly to individual districts. In a multi-member legislature
including faithful agents of the district median voters, the median party does not generally
correspond to the national median voter (Morelli, 2004). Historically, the concentration
of left voters in cities and industrial areas that emerged during the industrial revolution
meant that left parties won their core districts with many surplus votes that could not be
transferred to affect marginal districts, putting them at a competitive disadvantage, even in
the absence of malapportionment or gerrymandering, and this electoral map often persists
(Rodden, 2010). PR mitigates this problem by pooling votes for candidates of the same
party in larger electoral districts. However, cross-national investigations have not settled
whether PR, beyond mitigating seats-votes disproportionality, actually entails a stronger
connection between policymakers and the national electorate (Golder and Stramski, 2010;
Lupu, Selios and Warner, 2017; Powell, 2009). One reason for the mixed findings may be
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that these studies do not – and usually cannot – compare the performance of alternative
electoral institutions for the same electoral geography.
Second, partisan conflict about policy undermines the selection of good politicians. While
general, the adverse effects of partisan polarization can be more consequential under PR. Po-
litical polarization is the separation of politics into different partisan camps (McCarty, Poole
and Rosenthal, 2006, 3). This means that voters’ political preferences are closely tied to
a marker of their group, such as class, income, religion or ethnicity, and parties represent
different groups. In the model, it is captured by the difference of policy preferences between
groups. The strategic choices of politicians may leave voters with a hard choice between
sacrificing either policy or quality. The underlying political problem is one of commitment
and opportunism. Citizens would be better off if they could credibly commit to only support-
ing high-quality politicians, thereby inducing parties to nominate good politicians. When
actually faced with a choice between a low-quality politician of their preferred partisan type
and a high-quality politician of another party, this threat is not always credible. For cross-
pressured voters, sacrificing quality is the lesser evil unless polarization is low or they are in
no position to affect policy. In turn, this commitment problem generates bad incentives for
parties to supply high-quality politicians. Parties become more reluctant to incur the cost of
promoting high-quality candidates, and politicians with the power to influence nominations
may block better candidates to advance their own careers. This logic does not imply that
elections generally lead to the selection of low-quality politicians, as the potential entry of
other parties can provide countervailing incentives, but this depends on the rules of the game.
Holding other things equal, PR may supply fewer good politicians. The reason is that
the trade-off between policy and quality can apply to a larger number of voters, thus re-
ducing parties’ incentives to nominate high-quality politicians. Under MR, voters in the
median district(s) are most susceptible to the quality-policy trade-off. For them, the cost of
voting for the higher quality politician may be forsaking their preferred policy, by critically
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changing the partisan balance in the assembly. Under PR, a broader number of people,
beyond a potentially small number of single-member districts, can use their votes to affect
the distribution of policymaking power. This resulting commitment problem entails lower-
powered incentives to nominate good politicians. They are the flip side of higher policy
responsiveness.
The ability of voters to rank candidates of a party, through open-list PR, does not
necessarily solve this problem because nominations to the list are strategic and suffer from
the same incentives. Of course, if there is no policy disagreement in society and the quality of
politicians is the only salient electoral issue, both sets of institutions should tend to produce
the same outcome as parties have undiluted incentives to compete on quality.
From existing work on electoral rules and political selection it is far from obvious why PR
would perform worse in supplying good politicians. Mill (1861), for instance, suggests the
opposite, arguing that lowering the barrier to entry for minority groups increases competition
and thus the quality of politicians across the board. Capturing a similar intuition, the
seminal model of Myerson (1993) highlights how PR increases the selection of intrinsically
motivated politicians (non-corrupt in his terminology) because it reduces the probability of a
coordination failure among voters with shared policy preferences. In his model, voters have
the choice between a high-quality and a low-quality party for each discrete policy position.
Under MR, voters may face a coordination problem that leads them to support a corrupt
party because supporting the non-corrupt alternative with the same position would be a
wasted vote potentially helping the opposed party to win.
Our framework shares the premise that political competition shapes representation through
political selection on a partisan and a quality dimension, but it highlights a different institu-
tional effect and mechanisms. In contrast to Myerson (1993), we do not assume that voters
always have a choice of good politicians for a given policy position. We analyze when parties
will supply them, and conclude that the interplay of commitment problems and opportunism
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can affect selection differentially across electoral institutions, even if voters are well-informed
and there is an equal pool of high-quality politicians.3
Formalization
There are three groups of voters, denoted by i ∈ {L,M,H}, with distinct ideal points
xL, xM , xH on a single policy dimension.
4 We normalize xL = 0 and let xH/2 > xM > 0.
The total size of the (voting) population is unity and voters are distributed across three
equally sized districts, indexed by d. For each group i, there is a party consisting of a pool
of politicians who share the group’s ideal point, xi, and vary in their quality, which we
interpret as intrinsic motivation or integrity. The quality of a politician is represented by ω.
It suffices to distinguish between bad or low-quality types (ω = 0) and good or high-quality
types (ω = 1). For simplicity, we assume that each party includes a good politician and a
bad politician in each district.5 This means that parties can choose high-quality politicians,
though they may not have incentives to do so.
The utility of a citizen i is represented by
Vi = u(|x∗ − xi|) + g
(
3∑
MP=1
ωMP
)
(1)
where u(|x∗ − xi|) is a standard spatial utility function. Utility increases as the distance
between the equilibrium policy x∗ and the citizen’s ideal point xi declines and achieves its
unique maximum at xi. The equilibrium policy x
∗ is determined by the median legislator in a
three-member parliament. The function g = g
(∑3
MP=1 ωMP
)
captures payoffs generated by
3In other closely related work, the strategic balancing model of Beath et al. (2016) demonstrates that
increasing the magnitude of electoral districts can improve both policy responsiveness to the median voter
and the quality of politicians in a party-free setting. Galasso and Nannicini (2017) study how electoral rules
shape the selection of good politicians in a two-party system with probabilistic voting.
4The model extends the multi-district framework of Morelli (2004) by adding a quality dimension.
5While group membership and quality may be correlated in the population, each group has high-quality
people that may enter politics (Dal Bo´ et al., 2017).
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the quality of all elected MPs: g increases with each additional high-quality MP. Realistically,
there is a minimal amount of policy conflict between citizens so that meaningful goal conflicts
may exist. Operationally, this assumption means that voters of type i prefer a parliament
that implements their ideal policy to a parliament that implements the ideal policy of the
next closest group j 6= i and includes one additional high-quality legislator.
As in related theories (Galasso and Nannicini, 2017; Myerson, 1993), we assume that
party labels and politicians’ quality are known to voters. While party labels are on the
ballot, direct information about the quality of politicians is not. However, this does not mean
that voters are invariably clueless. Politicians have a reputation, based on their pre-political
career, track-record in previous political office and involvement in scandals.6 For instance, the
media widely reported on the fraudulent reimbursement of parliamentary expenses in Britain,
Germany or the European Union, and studies find that voters respond to this information
by voting against corrupt politicians or the party list they are running on (Eggers, 2014;
Rudolph and Da¨ubler, 2016).7 The possibility that such information becomes salient shapes
the incentives of parties to select good politicians ex-ante.8
Political parties do not select good politicians by default. While parties recognize the
instrumental value of quality (voters like it), they do not fully internalize the societal benefits
of selecting high-quality politicians. One reason is individual self-interest. Anticipating when
they are able to exploit voters’ trade-off between policy and quality, influential politicians
may try to block the nomination of higher-quality competitors and get themselves elected
instead (Besley et al., 2017). For party leaders or parties collectively, selecting high-quality
politicians comes at a (potentially small) cost, which includes foregone rents and opportunity
6Directly observable to the party selectorate.
7Punishment is conditional on the partisan stakes, consistent with the trade-off faced by voters in our
framework. Moreover, Online Appendix S3.1 reports evidence that MPs’ legislative behavior predicts reelec-
tion in multi-member districts.
8We only need a non-trivial probability that candidate quality is revealed before the election. Assum-
ing that voters are less informed about candidates under PR does not alter our central hypothesis. This
informational channel is complementary.
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costs (Galasso and Nannicini, 2011, 2017). In the text, we focus on the role of individual
self-interest. In an alternative formulation, we focus on the selection problem of the party
leadership, which allocates candidates to influence policy and win parliamentary office, and
show that it leads to the same institutional effect (Online Appendix S1.2).
Individual politicians care about policy and office. A politician of partisan type i receives
spatial utility u(|x∗ − xi|). The benefit of office is captured by pi. While running for office is
costly, captured by c, the benefits of winning a seat are larger than the cost of campaigning,
pi/3 > c > 0.9 To highlight the role of private incentives in a simple way, let us assume that
low-quality politicians have an advantage in the candidate selection stage within their party.
They are gatekeepers. This means that if a low-quality politician declares her candidacy, the
party’s high-quality type in that district is not able to run. If the low-quality type does not
run, the high-quality type may run as the party’s candidate.10 Note that this assumption
does not imply that low-quality politicians generally have a higher chance of being elected
than high-quality politicians. Because voters value quality as well a policy and are strategic,
they are sometimes willing to vote for high-quality candidates from a party not representing
their group, generating incentives for gatekeepers to allow high-quality politicians to enter.
Political competition consists of the interaction between candidacy decisions by politicians
and vote choices by citizens. Electoral institutions define the formal rules of the game.
Majority rule Under MR, one MP is elected per electoral district d and the candidate with
a plurality of votes wins. The timing of events is as follows. First, politicians simultaneously
decide whether they want to run for office in their respective district d or not. A high-quality
politician of an arbitrary partisan type in district d, denoted by i1d, only gets to run if the
party’s low-quality politician in the district, i0d, decides to stay out. Second, voters cast their
9Following Morelli (2004), this inequality is more stringent than needed but convenient to characterize
politicians’ behavior in the PR game, reducing ambiguity about who declares candidacy if a party expects
to win at least one but less than three seats.
10For recent evidence, see Besley et al. (2017).
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ballot for one of the candidates in their district. Third, payoffs are realized based on x∗ and
g∗ and the game ends.
Proportional representation Under PR, each party draws up a list of up to three can-
didates and seats are allocated proportionally to the votes received by (non-empty) lists.
Similar to many real-world systems, the mapping from votes to seats is calculated using a
quota rule and the largest remainder method. A party that wins at least 1/3 (or multiple
thereof) of the votes wins one seat (or multiple thereof). Any remaining seats are allocated
to the party with the largest share of votes after subtracting 1/3 for any seat it has already
obtained.
The sequence of events is as follows. First, parties simultaneously choose lists. As in the
majoritarian system, low-quality politicians are gatekeepers in candidate selection within
each party. In party with partisanship i, all low-quality types i0d that declare their candidacy
are put on the list, and their order is determined randomly. Remaining slots are filled by
high-quality types i1d if they declared their candidacy. Second, the election takes place and
voters cast their ballot for a party list. Third, payoffs are realized and the game ends.
Voting Voting is strategic under both MR and PR and we allow voters to be strongly
coordinated, potentially as the result of opinion polls, news media, social networks and
political campaigns (Morelli, 2004). Voters have induced preferences over the composition
of parliament in terms of ideology and quality. It is natural to think of players as being
able to communicate about possible electoral coalitions during the campaign period without
being able to credibly commit to a particular voting or entry strategy. Hence we solve each
game for perfectly coalition-proof Nash equilibria, which means that voting strategies and
candidacy decisions are robust to credible deviations by any coalition of players (Bernheim,
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Peleg and Whinston, 1987).11
Electoral geography Motivated by evidence about the distribution of voter preferences,
we consider an electoral geography where one group is inefficiently concentrated in cities or
industrial areas (Rodden, 2010). Suppose that the median voter in district d = 1 is of type
L, the median voter in d = 2 is of type M and the median voter in d = 3 is of type H. At
the same time, the median voter in the voter population at large is of type L. Technically,
we also assume that the population share of group L minus 1/3 is larger than the population
share of the smallest group. This ensures that PR in fact leads to fairly proportional results
if all voters vote for their preferred partisan types.
Comparing equilibrium outcomes
Table 1 summarizes the equilibrium outcomes under the two alternative electoral systems,
MR and PR, in terms of the equilibrium policy (x∗) and the endogenous quality of elected
MPs (g∗). Given the unequal electoral geography where the majority group L is inefficiently
concentrated in its core district(s), the equilibrium policy under MR corresponds to the ideal
point of the median voter in the median district (xM) rather than that of the median voter
in the population (xL) and 2/3 of all legislators are good types (g = g(2)). Under PR, the
equilibrium policy corresponds to the ideal point of the median voter in the population (xL).
If political polarization, defined as the distance between ideal points xM and xL, is relatively
high, only 1/3 of all legislators elected in the PR election are good types (g = g(1)).12 In
this situation, there is a clear institutional trade-off. Compared to MR, PR leads to a closer
representation of the electorate’s policy preferences but performs less well in selecting high-
11There are multiple Nash equilibria. The refinement rules out equilibria based on a complete failure of
coordination, as they are less plausible in a setting of institutionalized party competition.
12In a multi-party setting polarization can be defined in various ways (e.g., studies such as Alt and
Dreyer Lassen (2006) use the range or standard deviation of party positions). What matters in equilibrium
is the minimal distance of ideal points between groups, which simplifies to xM - xL. While polarization is
continuous, best-responding behavior implies a cutoff.
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quality politicians (g(1) < g(2)). If polarization is relatively low, both electoral systems
produce the same quality of MPs (g = g(2)).
Table 1: Equilibrium outcomes under alternative electoral systems
Majority rule PR
Low polarization x = xM , g = g(2) x = xL, g = g(2)
High polarization x = xM , g = g(2) x = xL, g = g(1)
Proposition 1 summarizes the qualitative comparison of equilibrium outcomes across
electoral systems that will be tested in the empirical part. (A proof is in Online Appendix
S1.) Given the electoral geography and polarized policy preferences, a clear-cut empirical
implication is that replacing MR by PR should increase the policy congruence between
politicians in parliament and the median voter in the population but reduce the average
quality of MPs.
Proposition 1. Assume the unequal electoral geography specified in the text. Compared to
MR, equilibrium policy under PR is closer to the median voter in the population and, if
political polarization is high, the average quality of elected politicians is strictly lower.
Under MR, an equilibrium entails the election of a good L-type politician in district 1
(where L is the majority group), a good H-type politician in district 3 (where H is the median
voter) and a bad M -type politician in district 2 (where M is the median). This parliament
is denoted by {L11,M02 , H13}.13 A politician’s partisan type is denoted by i ∈ {L,M,H},
and her quality is indicated by superscript ω = 1 (high), ω = 0 (low). Equilibrium policy,
x∗ = xM , corresponds to the median MP, who represents the median voter in the median
district rather than the population median. The bad M02 -type in district 2 runs, blocking
13Outcome-equivalent parliament {M11 ,M02 ,M13 } can also occur.
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the entry of a good M12 -type. This occurs because M voters in the district cannot credibly
commit to vote against her given that this would swing equilibrium policy to either xL or xH .
Hence, M02 exploits the stark trade-off between policy and quality faced by her co-partisans.
The same commitment problem does not exist in the two other districts. As neither of
these districts can unilaterally change policy in a favorable direction, voters will punish bad
politicians of their partisan type (off the equilibrium path) and so only good types enter
and win. Thus, quality is relatively high because voters in most districts can focus on the
quality dimension of the politicians competing in the district without affecting the policy
outcome in the legislature. While all voters could be made better off by adding another
high-quality politician without changing policy, a coalitional deviation to achieve this Pareto
improvement is not self-enforcing.14
The selection of legislators plays out differently under PR because a larger segment of
voters confronts a policy-quality trade-off. In particular, L voters face a hard choice: Do
they support a parliament that implements their preferred policy but consists of up to 2/3
bad L candidates or do they support a parliament composed of more high-quality politicians
from a different party? If policy disagreement is sufficiently high, gatekeepers are able to run
bad types on the list without suffering a sufficient electoral penalty, and given their private
incentives they prefer to do so. The resulting parliament is {L0, L0, K1}, where the third
seat is either claimed by a high-quality type of party M or H (and subscripts for districts
are dropped). Compared to MR, a majority of voters faces the problem that voting based
on the quality of politicians would adversely affect the policy outcome. This makes it more
difficult to credibly commit to vote against “their” bad politicians.
As a result, given high polarization, the average quality of elected politicians is strictly
14Suppose L and M voters come to an agreement that district 1 elects M11 to allow district 2 voters to
vote against M02 and support L
1
2 instead, thus inducing x
∗ = xM and g(3). However, assuming M voters
keep their side of the bargain, L voters in district 1 will be better off reneging and voting for L01 to change
policy to xL.
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lower under PR than MR. If polarization is low, voters’ commitment problem is mitigated
and quality improves under PR to the level achieved by MR. The corresponding equilibrium
parliament is {L0, L1, K1}.
This logic does not imply that PR always improves policy responsiveness or reduces
quality compared to MR. The model helps to clarify that the institutional effect may depend
on the geographical distribution and polarization of voter preferences.15 Hence, the empirical
tests of Proposition 1 presented below focus on polities where the argument suggests a trade-
off is present.16
Evidence from the introduction of PR in Switzerland
To test the central implications of the model, we leverage an electoral reform introducing
PR in the Swiss canton of Zu¨rich in 1916. It provides an unusually controlled setting to
study how variation on the intensive margin of a fundamental change of the electoral system
affects political representation.
Historical context
At the time, electoral reform was a salient political issue in many of Europe’s young democ-
racies. The contested question was whether to replace the existing majoritarian electoral
system with a variant of PR (Ahmed, 2013; Boix, 1999). In federal Switzerland, electoral
reform was also an important topic at the canton (i.e., state) level, and proportional represen-
tation was introduced there first (Funk and Gathmann, 2013). Universal male suffrage was
15For instance, consider a different electoral geography and assume that the three groups are of equal size
and each electoral district resembles the national distribution of voters. It follows that the policy outcome
corresponds to the ideal point of group M in both electoral systems.
16Future work should test the relevance of these system-level context conditions. This requires a different,
probably cross-national, research design.
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already established in the nineteenth century and cantons were in charge of most domestic
policies.17
In a referendum held in December 1916, 53 percent of voters supported the adoption
of PR for the cantonal parliament (Kantonsrat) of Zu¨rich. Three months earlier a narrow
majority of the incumbent MPs had voted against the reform. The legislative vote was su-
perseded by the popular vote. Under the old majoritarian electoral system, MPs were elected
using absolute majority voting in districts of varying magnitude, single-member as well as
multi-member districts.18 This system was common in Europe (Ahmed, 2013, 65). The elec-
toral reform put in place PR with several larger multi-member districts. Importantly, other
political institutions were not affected by the reform. Voting rights, instruments of direct
democracy, and parliamentary institutions, including term duration and the compensation
of MPs, remained stable.
A multiparty system had already emerged under the old system (Gruner, 1977, 66).
Two bourgeois parties belonging to the liberal party family, the center-right Liberal Party
(Freisinn) and the center-left Democratic Party, had dominated cantonal politics since the
1870s. They were confronted by the rising Social Democratic Party. The Farmers’ Party was
established in the wake of the electoral reform, with several politicians (including incumbent
MPs) breaking off from the Liberals. Two small Christian conservative parties (one Catholic
and one Protestant) also entered parliament under PR. After previous proposals to introduce
PR had been defeated, the final push for electoral reform by referendum was supported uni-
formly by the Social Democrats, which expected to gain from a more proportional mapping
from votes to seats (Kummer, 1969). As shown in Online Appendix Figure S2.1, support for
electoral reform varied greatly across municipalities.
17Zu¨rich was the second most populated canton and it had the largest cantonal parliament (222 members
in 1914). While several smaller cantons introduced PR before (Funk and Gathmann, 2013, 1183), prior
reforms do not generally share the same features. For instance, in Ticino, the first canton to switch to PR,
the reform was imposed by the federal government in response to a civil war.
18A second round is held for seats without an absolute majority winner.
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The reform took place in a context of electoral politics polarized by class antagonism and
an uneven electoral geography, consistent with the two system-level conditions highlighted by
the model. Support for the left was heavily concentrated in industrialized cities and towns,
whereas support for the center-right parties was more evenly spread. As a consequence, the
Social Democrats suffered from an inefficient votes-to-seats ratio and were underrepresented
in parliament (Gruner, 1978, 242).19 Hence, the introduction of PR was one of their central
political demands. Reflecting a deepening class conflict leading up to World War I and into
the interwar years, the Social Democrats and the bourgeois parties represented starkly dif-
ferent policy positions and ideologies, with a radicalized left challenging the existing political
and social order (Ahmed 2013, 61, 200-205; Gruner 1977, 55). The large variation in refer-
endum results across districts also indicates significant polarization of policy preferences in
the electorate.20
Before and after the reform, candidates were chosen in district-level party meetings,
where participation was limited to dues-paying party members. Consistent with the gate-
keeping version of the model, this setting also provided party elites with formal and informal
opportunities to shape nominations, such as setting the agenda and proposing candidates,
and there is anecdotal evidence that elites dominated the meetings selecting candidates.21
More systematically, some studies of this period have shown that collective decision-making
in public meetings, compared to elections with secret ballots, can be more prone to elite
capture (Hinnerich and Pettersson-Lidbom, 2014).
19With an average votes-to-seats ratio of 1.87 in last five pre-reform elections, comparable to British
Labour’s ratio of 1.8 in 1910-1918.
20See Appendix Table S2.3. As another indication of polarization, only two economic variables, industrial
employment and foreign workers, predict 76% of the variation in left party support across districts.
21A newspaper report describes candidate selection in a district meeting of the Social Democrats: First,
an incumbent MP gave an hour-long speech, then the meeting’s president announced the list of candidates
and the present rank-and-file members approved it “without discussion” (Gru¨tlianer (Zu¨rich), April 20, 1914,
p. 2). While attendance data is not generally available, another newspaper report implies that a meeting
nominating candidates for the bourgeois list in a competitive district assembled 70 members, which amounts
to only 4.5% of their voters (Gru¨tlianer, June 22, 1917, p. 3).
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The reform’s intensive margin
The reform had two main components. First, it changed the voting rule that defines how
votes are translated into seats. Absolute majority rule was replaced by open-list PR.22 Sec-
ond, it increased the magnitude of electoral districts. The existing 56 electoral districts were
aggregated to 18 larger districts. The result was an increase, on average, in the number
of MPs elected in a district from 4 to 12. Importantly, the increase in district magnitude
was not uniform but varied across districts based on administrative constraints rather than
partisan politics. Given the same proportional electoral formula, a larger increase in dis-
trict magnitude implies a larger dosage of electoral proportionality. Our empirical strategy
exploits this variation in the intensity of the reform using a difference-in-difference design.
To illustrate this within-reform variation, Table 2 depicts the mapping from electoral
districts in the last pre-reform parliament (1914-1917) to electoral districts in the first post-
reform parliament (1917-1920). The pre-reform electoral districts are nested within the
larger post-reform electoral districts. Electoral districts were drawn to respect pre-existing
community borders. The canton consisted of 187 municipalities (Politische Gemeinden) of
varying size, which were grouped into 11 administrative districts (Bezirke). An electoral
district is formed by several contiguous municipalities belonging to the same Bezirk.23 In
turn, the number of seats awarded to a district was a function of population size, mandated
in the cantonal constitution.24
Historical documents and research indicate that electoral districts for the cantonal par-
liament were not drawn in a partisan manner (Gruner 1978, 541; Kummer 1969, 17). The
outlines of the pre-reform districts were drawn before the emergence of the modern party sys-
tem (Kummer, 1969, 25). The consensual, largely non-political process of drawing districts
22Most voters (83%) voted a straight party list despite the option to rank candidates.
23The exception is pre-reform district 22, which combined adjacent municipalities from two different
Bezirke, and was split in the reform at the Bezirk boundary, adding the largest part to new district 9.
24One MP for 1800 citizens.
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at the cantonal level stands in contrast with the more partisan districting (“Wahlkreisgeome-
trie”) at the national level (Gruner, 1978; Kummer, 1969). This is an important advantage
of focusing on the cantonal level.
Table 2: Electoral reform and district magnitude in canton of Zu¨rich
Majority rule (1914) PR (1917)
Electoral district Adm. district
(Bezirk)
Seats Average
Seats in
Bezirk
Electoral
district
Seats
56 Niederhasli Dielsdorf 2
1.75
18 8
55 Regensdorf Dielsdorf 3 18 8
54 Scho¨fflisdorf Dielsdorf 1 18 8
53 Stadel Dielsdorf 1 18 8
52 Kloten-Basserdorf Bu¨lach 4
3
17 12
51 Embrach Bu¨lach 3 17 12
50 Bu¨lach Bu¨lach 3 17 12
49 Eglisau Bu¨lach 2 17 12
...
...
...
...
...
6 Zu¨rich-Unterstrass Zu¨rich 11 11 3 11
...
...
...
...
...
2 Zu¨rich-Enge Zu¨rich 6
7.5
1 15
1 Zu¨rich-Altstadt Zu¨rich 9 1 15
Notes: Based on Official Compilation of Laws (Offizielle Sammlung) of canton Zu¨rich Vol.
30 (pp. 58-65 and pp. 422-428).
The reform aggregated electoral districts to the larger administrative districts (Bezirke).
For instance, as illustrated in Table 2, districts 53-56 were combined to form a new district
corresponding to the Bezirk of Dielsdorf. As a result, average district magnitude increased
more than four times from 1.75 to 8. Similarly, districts 49-52 were merged to form a district
corresponding to the Bezirk of Bu¨lach, and district magnitude increased from 3 to 12. Some
urban districts, however, experienced no change in magnitude because there were already
quite large (e.g., Zu¨rich-Unterstrass). The reform respected the constraint that each pre-
21
existing Bezirk should be represented by (at least) one electoral district. Administrative
borders constraining districting are the result of history, which we account for in the analysis
using fixed effects, rather than contemporaneous political choices. They were defined by law
in 1831 and changing them required majority support in a referendum, which made them
remarkably stable. While parliament was divided on the overall merits of electoral reform,
there was broad agreement on the question of electoral districts.25
Figure 1 summarizes the resulting variation in the reform’s intensive margin, as captured
by the ratio of post-reform district magnitude to average pre-reform district magnitude in the
same unit. A ratio of 1 indicates no change and larger values indicate higher reform intensity.
The variation ranges from no change up to a 6.6-fold increase of district magnitude.
It is instructive to note some differences between the electoral institutions analyzed in the
theoretical model and their empirical counterparts, and explain why they do not alter the
theoretical expectations. First, the model considers one-round elections in the majoritarian
system, whereas the empirical case is based on absolute majority voting that may lead to
a run-off. Adding a run-off stage to the model does not change the predictions. In fact,
run-offs do not usually occur in equilibrium in this framework, consistent with reality in
this case.26 Second, the theoretical comparison is between single-member districts under
MR and a polity-wide multimember district under PR. Empirically, district magnitude is
heterogenous in each system. What matters is that the reform, on average, entailed a
significant increase in district magnitude and magnitude never declined.27 While the model
has opted for parsimony and more generic institutional features, its predictions apply to this
particular case.
25On May 22, 1916, individual districts were agreed upon either unanimously or with supermajorities.
Minutes from meetings of the Social Democratic parliamentary group also indicate that districts were not a
salient issue (March 8 and March 22, 1916).
26In the 1914 election 99% of all seats were decided in the first round, indicating a high degree of electoral
coordination even though in most districts there were more candidates than seats.
27Online Appendix S1.3 formally illustrates a comparison between MR with multi-member districts and
PR.
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Figure 1: The electoral reform’s intensive margin
Data and measurement
We assembled an original data set that measures the legislative behavior and socio-demographic
attributes of individual MPs in the canton and combines them with data on district char-
acteristics and electoral institutions. It covers the last two parliaments elected before the
reform (1911 and 1914) and the first post-reform parliament (elected in 1917). These three
parliamentary terms belong to the same apportionment period based on the 1910 decennial
federal census. This rules out population-based redistricting or other policy changes based on
the census. Our main sources are parliamentary records, compilations of referendum results
and the census. We also draw on newspapers to code party affiliations. Altogether, across
all parliaments there are 723 MPs.28
Measuring representation We consider two distinct aspects of representation. The first
measure captures the policy responsiveness of MPs compared to the preferences of the elec-
28Online Appendix S2 provides descriptive statistics and sources for all variables.
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torate on salient issues. Following recent studies of contemporary Switzerland (Portmann,
Stadelmann and Eichenberger, 2012), we exploit an institutional setting combining direct
and representative democracy to measure whether an MP’s vote on a law proposal in par-
liament is congruent with the popular vote on the same proposal in a referendum. The
cantonal constitution mandates referendums on major laws, constitutional changes and sig-
nificant spending increases. In addition, an initiative referendum may put a topic on the
agenda, based on the support of a minority of MPs or the collection of a sufficient number of
signatures. This institutional setting provides an opportunity to observe the voting behavior
of MPs and voters on the same policy proposals. We have compiled roll-call votes from the
parliamentary records, available at the cantonal state archive, and matched them with the
corresponding referendum results, retrieved from the canton’s referendum database. Follow-
ing the theoretical conception of policy representation benchmarked to the median voter in
the population (Cox 1997, 226; Powell and Vanberg 2000), an MP’s parliamentary vote is
coded as congruent if it matches the cantonal majority in the corresponding referendum and
is coded as dissonant otherwise (we report results using alternative operationalizations).
This approach captures political actions (rather than non-binding campaign statements
or survey responses) on concrete and salient policies and it measures politicians and voters
on a comparable scale. One complication is that roll-call votes only exist for a subset of all
cantonal referendums (15.6%) for two terms (1914-17 and 1917-20).29 Online Appendix S2
lists the matched votes and documents that referendums with corresponding roll-call votes
are similar on observed features to those without roll-call votes.
Our second second set of outcome variables taps into the willingness of MPs to contribute
to activities that are collectively essential to make parliament work. Following our theoretical
emphasis, regular legislative attendance is an important behavioral manifestation of quality
related to intrinsic motivation. Høyland, Hobolt and Hix (2017, 5) argue that participation
29A roll-call takes place if such a request is supported by at least 30 MPs.
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is “a pivotal indicator of a legislator’s ‘valence’ (for example, his or her quality, commitment
or diligence).” It is a key component of the parliamentary production function (Fisman
et al., 2015; Gagliarducci, Nannicini and Naticchioni, 2011). Absent MPs are not able to
introduce, defend, criticize or vote on policy proposals or interpellate the executive. In that
sense, MPs’ “participation in legislative activities is a prerequisite for political influence”
(Høyland, Hobolt and Hix, 2017, 17). This is certainly relevant for this parliament because
the speaking agenda was open (every MP had the right to speak at least once before debate
could be closed), the number of standing committees was limited and the floor extensively
debated and amended legislation coming from the ad-hoc committee dealing with each major
law. In line with this, Online Appendix S3.1 provides evidence that MPs’ attendance is a
significant predictor of their reelection and contributions to parliamentary debates (as a
robustness check, we directly use speeches as the dependent variable). Consistent with the
notion of a public good, the parliamentary rules make attendance mandatory and penalize
non-attendance, and any binding motion of parliament requires a quorum of at least one-half
of all MPs. Party leaders also emphasize the importance of participation. For instance, in
a meeting of Social Democratic MPs, documented in handwritten minutes, a party elder
implores his colleagues to punctually attend the next parliamentary session because it will
debate an important issue.30 Not surprisingly, average attendance rates are high (0.86). We
calculate each MP’s attendance rate in a term from the parliamentary records.
District characteristics The analysis controls for characteristics of electoral districts
that may vary over time as a function of changing district boundaries. From the 1910
census, we calculate the employment share in the industrial sector (capturing the left’s
mobilization potential), religious fractionalization, language fractionalization and the share
of the foreign population in a given electoral district, using the pre-reform boundaries for
30Hermann Greulich on August 11, 1916.
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the parliaments elected in 1911 and 1914 and the larger post-reform boundaries for the
parliament elected in 1917. While the canton was dominantly (i.e, 75%) Protestant, the
Christian-Social Party appealed to “diaspora Catholics” (Gruner, 1977, 116). In industrial
areas there was a relatively large number of foreign workers, mostly drawn from Germany,
Italy and Austria-Hungary. They did not have the right to vote but were organized by trade
unions (Gruner, 1977, 132). We calculate voter support for PR in the referendum, accounting
for a variable omitted in most prior research.
MP characteristics MPs’ characteristics include their age, occupation, information on
other political offices, education and party affiliation. They are derived from the biographical
information in the parliamentary records.
Empirical strategy
To estimate the effect of the introduction of PR on representation, our empirical strategy
takes advantage of variation in the intensity of the reform across electoral districts. The
basic difference-in-difference regression model takes the following form:
Yidt = θ(Reform intensity)dp,17−14 + αdp + λt + βXdt + idt. (2)
The outcome variable Yidt is a measure of legislative behavior of MP i in electoral district d
and parliamentary term t: (i) an indicator for whether the MP’s vote on an issue is congruent
with the majority in the popular vote, or (ii) parliamentary attendance in the term. The
variable (Reform intensity)dp,17−14 captures the heterogeneous nature of the electoral reform.
It is zero in the two pre-reform parliaments elected under the majoritarian system in 1911
and 1914. In the first election held under PR in 1917, reform intensity in a post-reform
electoral district dp (nesting the smaller pre-reform districts) is measured as the ratio of the
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district magnitude in the post-reform district dp to the average pre-reform district magnitude
(in the 1914 election) in pre-reform districts nested in dp (plotted in Figure 1). We take the
natural log of this ratio as this normalizes no change in district magnitude to zero and is
equivalent to analyzing the differences in the logged levels of district magnitude. It also
captures declining marginal returns to increasing district magnitude.31
The specification includes fixed effects at the level of post-electoral districts, αdp . They
strip out the cross-sectional institutional variation and account for time-invariant unobserv-
ables, such as historical determinants of administrative borders, urbanization or distance to
the parliament. Hence, identification comes from the arguably exogenous change in district
magnitude based on pre-determined administrative units. Indicators for the parliamentary
term λt capture common shocks across all districts (the pre-reform term serves as the base-
line). District controls discussed above are represented by Xdt. The analysis of legislative
votes also includes a set of dummies for the different votes.
In this specification, θ captures the causal effect of electoral reform on the behavior of
MPs as long as the difference-in-difference assumption holds, and we find evidence supporting
it. The varying treatment intensity allows us to control for other potentially relevant changes
in the political environment of legislators. Following prior research on the effects of political
reform on legislative behavior (Fisman et al., 2015, 896), the baseline specification excludes
MP characteristics, as political selection is part of the conjectured mechanism. Nonetheless,
it is appropriate to control for characteristics of MPs to the extent that they capture fixed
variation in the pool of candidates across parties (assumed away in the theoretical model).
Hence, we also present results controlling for party affiliation, age, indicators for working-
class occupations and farmers, membership in national parliament, and exit due to death
(see Gagliarducci, Nannicini and Naticchioni, 2011; Høyland, Hobolt and Hix, 2017).
31Equivalently, one may write (Reform intensity)dp,17−14 = log(
DMdp,17
¯DMdp,14
)λ17 where λ17 is a dummy for
the reform election. District fixed effects make it redundant to include the time-invariant component of the
interaction.
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Standard errors for the regression parameters are clustered at the level of post-reform
electoral districts. They accommodate heteroscedasticity and within-cluster correlation. In
addition to asymptotic standard errors, we also use the resampling procedure proposed by
Cameron, Gelbach and Miller (2008) to avoid over-confident confidence intervals, as the
number of clusters (18) is relatively small.
Results
Table 3 reports the estimated effect of reform intensity on how well elected politicians repre-
sent the electorate. In columns 1-3, the dependent variable is an indicator measuring whether
there is congruence between the parliamentary vote of an individual MP and the popular
majority in the referendum on the issue. All models include district characteristics and fixed
effects for votes. Column 2 adds district fixed effects and column 3 adds MP characteristics.
In all models, the estimates suggest that a higher intensity of the electoral reform leads
to a larger increase in policy responsiveness by MPs to the cantonal electorate. The effect
is substantively and statistically significant and changes little across specifications. Model
2 implies that going from zero to median reform intensity (1.1) increases the congruence
of legislative and popular votes by approximately 21 percentage points on average, which
corresponds to 0.43 standard deviations of the dependent variable.32
Column 4 reports results from an aggregate-level analysis of congruence conducted at the
level of post-reform districts. The dependent variable for this analysis is an indicator (1=yes,
0=no) of whether a majority of MPs in the district is congruent with the popular majority
on the binary policy question. This captures that policy responsiveness does not require that
32For the analysis of congruence, there are 1,108 potential observations if all MPs vote, excluding the
non-voting president. We observe 898 votes as there are 17 abstentions, 189 cases of non-attendance and 4
cases where a vacant seat had not yet been filled. Controlling for MP characteristics, 34 cases are dropped
due to missing data. For attendance, the analysis includes all MPs who serve in a parliament, including those
who enter during the term to replace dropouts; this means that the number of observations per parliament
is somewhat larger than the total number of seats (223 and 222, respectively).
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all MPs vote the same way. The statistical specification is the same as before except that we
cannot control for individual MP characteristics. Clearly, higher reform intensity leads to a
significantly higher probability of congruence (also see Online Appendix Table S3.7).
Models 5-7 in Table 3 show the effect of reform intensity on attendance. For compa-
rability, the analysis focuses on the pre-reform parliament and the post-reform parliament
(for results including the 1911-1914 parliament and pre-treatment trends, see Online Ap-
pendix Table S3.6). The coefficient on reform intensity varies little across specifications and
is statistically significant at the 5 percent level. Higher reform intensity entails a relative
decline in attendance. Model 6 implies that going from zero to median reform intensity
decreases parliamentary attendance by 5 percentage points on average, which corresponds
to 0.41 standard deviations of attendance.
The magnitude of the effects of reform intensity on the two outcome variables is nearly
identical, after standardizing, given the variation in the outcome variables (see Figure 2).
The direction and size of the effects are consistent with a central implication of our theory.
A larger dosage of proportionality improves the responsiveness of MPs to the electorate
but it also decreases MPs’ participation. The research design rules out that these effects are
driven by district characteristics that are fixed in the short time span we consider, changes in
the socio-economic composition of districts, including voter preferences concerning electoral
reform, common shocks (e.g., World War I) or other political institutions.
Further sensitivity checks show that these results are robust to numerous alternative
specifications (Table S3.6). Moreover, using speeches and education as outcomes yields
qualitatively similar results to attendance (Table S3.3 and S3.4). The results are also robust
to dropping the city of Zu¨rich, which introduced PR for the municipal assembly in 1913 (Table
S3.8). While fixed effects capture this heterogeneity across units, exploring the heterogeneity
of the effect shows that the capital does not drive the result. Evidence that the reform effect
varies with pre-reform district magnitude, higher in more urban areas, is mixed (Table S3.9).
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Figure 2: Standardized effects of reform intensity
(a) MP−voter congruence
−0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
+ MP characteristics
+ District fixed effects
District controls
Effect of reform intensity (standardized)
l
l
l
(b) Parliamentary attendance
−1.0 −0.8 −0.6 −0.4 −0.2 0.0 0.2
Effect of reform intensity (standardized)
l
l
l
Note: The figure displays the effect of increasing reform intensity from 0 to median reform intensity
on (a) MP-median voter congruence and (b) parliamentary attendance, relative to the standard
deviation of each dependent variable. It shows that the effects on the two outcome variables are of
comparable magnitude. The underlying coefficient estimates are reported in Table 3. The
horizontal bars indicate 95% confidence intervals based on clustered standard errors.
What alternative explanations may account for the effects of the reform? One possibility
is that the effect on attendance is purely mechanical, reflecting varying occupational bases
of political recruitment across parties. The introduction of PR went hand in hand with a
change in the party system (consistent with our theory), most noticeably an increase in the
Social Democratic party group and the entry of the Farmer’s Party. In particular, farmers
face a seasonal work schedule that may make it more costly to attend parliament during
harvest season. Thus, the reform intensity effect may reflect fixed differences in politicians
across parties rather than strategic nominations. While plausible, we have largely ruled
out this possibility by controlling for MPs’ party affiliation (Table 3). Moreover, it is not
the case that participation was lower among MPs from the Farmer’s Party (Figure S3.2).
Relatedly, one may suspect that the two parties that gained most seats through the reform
faced binding supply constraints and were not able to find enough good candidates. This
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seems unlikely, because the Social Democrats could draw on a large pool of politicians with
local-level experience and the Farmer’s Party was new in name but not in personnel (as
other parties pointed out during the campaign). In line with this, the results are robust
to controlling for MPs’ previous local political experience or parliamentary seniority (Table
S3.10).33
The effects are not easily explained by seminal personal vote theories of electoral institu-
tions (Carey and Shugart, 1995). Participation, while a crucial input to lawmaking, is not
generally seen as an electoral asset specific to local representation. It may actually hurt the
ability to build a personal vote by reducing the time available for activities in the district
(Høyland, Hobolt and Hix, 2017). Local political experience or birthplace have been used
as measures of credible candidate ties to their district (Nemoto and Shugart, 2013; Shugart,
Valdini and Suominen, 2005). While we do not have data on birthplace, additional anal-
yses find no statistically significant effect of the reform on the selection of MPs with local
political experience (Table S3.5). Emphasizing a trade-off between local and party-based
representation, this line of theorizing also suggests that reform intensity may lead to more
cohesive parties. However, party cohesion on its own does not necessarily lead to higher
policy responsiveness to the median voter.
Finally, theories of electoral systems based on swing-voter models of electoral competition
with exchangeable politicians do not provide a straightforward explanation either (Persson
and Tabellini, 2000, ch. 8). In contrast to our model, they do not imply that PR improves
policy responsiveness to the median voter. Instead, policy should become more responsive to
a weighted mean of citizen preferences, where weights are inversely proportional to groups’
ideological biases, and all parties converge to this platform. In this framework, it is also
not clear whether the legislative effort of individual politicians will be lower in PR. While
electoral incentives for individual politicians to avoid shirking are highest in competitive
33Online Appendix S3.4 further explores the mechanisms.
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seats in majoritarian systems, the incentives in non-competitive seats can be significantly
lower than under PR, leaving the overall effect ambiguous.34
Contemporary Evidence
Theoretically, our argument applies to historical as well as contemporary democracies. To
empirically explore the external validity of our historical evidence, we provide some evidence
from a recent reform of electoral institutions in the European Parliament. It confirms the
existence of a significant institutional trade-off on a large scale.
The research design builds on our previous analysis in that it also exploits the intensive
margin of introducing PR. We leverage the adoption of PR for European elections in the
United Kingdom. For the first time in British history, the European Parliamentary Elec-
tions Act of 1999 introduced PR on a nation-wide basis, for the election of members of
the European Parliament (MEPs). While the country-specific electoral rules for the Euro-
pean Parliament remained the same elsewhere, in Britain the reform replaced the traditional
method of plurality voting in 84 single-member constituencies with closed-list proportional
representation in larger multi-member districts drawn at the level of pre-existing regions
(9 English regions, Scotland and Wales)35, where the new districts contain the smaller old
districts. This large-scale reform is characterized by considerable within-reform variation:
electoral rules in other member countries were not affected and the dosage of the reform
varies within Great Britain, ranging from an increase in district magnitude from 1 to 4 up
to an increase from 1 to 11.36
Given these institutional features, we use a difference-in-difference approach to estimate
the effect of reform intensity on the behavior of MEPs. We focus on the last parliament
34This argument has been applied to turnout (Cox, Fiva and Smith, 2016).
35The Single Transferable Vote system was retained for Northern Ireland.
36Previous research on the effects of electoral institutions on MEPs’ performance does not leverage this
reform (Fisman et al., 2015; Høyland, Hobolt and Hix, 2017).
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elected under the old rules (1994-1999) and the first post-reform parliament (1999-2004).
The study of Hix, Noury and Roland (2007) allows us to calculate two behavioral measures
capturing MEPs’ motivation and integrity, which helps to mitigate concerns about data
limitations in the historical case. The first measure is an MEP’s participation rate in roll-
call votes. The second measure is the fraction of times during which an MEP signed the
attendance register, which is linked to a substantial daily stipend (around 200 euros in 1994),
but did not participate in a single roll-call vote that day. This more explicit form of rent-
seeking behavior has at times drawn strong media scrutiny and is used in previous work as
a measure of shirking (Fisman et al., 2015, 877).37
Measuring policy responsiveness is more difficult because there are no directly compara-
ble data on mass policy preferences for most legislative votes. However, we can test whether
the electoral reform affects the link between citizens’ general political orientation, captured
by left-right placements in representative surveys, and MEPs’ general voting patterns in par-
liament, estimated from scaling models based on thousands of roll-call votes. For the latter,
we use the first-dimension NOMINATE scores estimated by Hix, Noury and Roland (2007),
which corresponds to classical left-right issues and explains an “overwhelming proportion in
the European Parliament” (Hix, Noury and Roland, 2007, 181). As popular ideology and
legislative ideology are not measured on the same scale, we do not calculate a measure of
congruence and instead use a relatively more flexible interactive statistical specification.
Table 4 presents the estimation results. Reform intensity is measured exactly as in
our previous case: It is zero before the reform and throughout for all MEPs not elected
in Great Britain. After the introduction of PR in Great Britain, reform intensity in the
British constituencies is the logged ratio of post-reform district magnitude to pre-reform
district magnitude. All models include fixed effects for electoral districts, which capture
heterogeneity across countries as well as, in multi-district countries like Britain, regions
37Descriptive statistics and sources for all variables are in Online Appendix S4.
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Table 4: Evidence from an Electoral Reform in the European Parliament
Attendance Shirking NOMINATE
(1) (2) (3)
Reform intensity -0.045 0.028
(0.012) (0.007)
[0.01] [0.01]
Reform intensity 0.053
× Mean citizen ideology (0.014)
[0.01]
Mean citizen ideology 0.321
(0.279)
[0.60]
District FE X X X
Observations 1,302 1,302 1,302
Notes: Dependent variables: attendance (model 1) is an MEP’s participation rate
in roll-call votes during the parliamentary term; shirking (model 2) measures the
fraction of parliamentary sitting in which an MEP signed the attendance register
but cast zero roll-call votes; NOMINATE (model 3) is the first dimension legislative
‘ideal point’ estimated scaled from roll-call votes by Hix, Noury and Roland (2007).
Estimation is by OLS. All models include a period dummy. Standard errors in
parentheses are clustered at level of post-reform electoral districts. Brackets report
p-values adjusted for clustering based on wild bootstrap. In the 4th parliament,
MEPs from Austria, Finland and Sweden are excluded as they are not covered
by the election survey used to calculate citizen ideology (102 cases); MEPs who
participated in less than 20 roll-call votes are also dropped because of missing
ideal-point estimates (22 additional cases).
within a country. A dummy for the 5th parliament captures common shocks.
Columns 1 and 2 in Table 4 show that higher reform intensity leads to lower participation
and higher shirking. The results are statistically and substantively relevant. For instance,
model 2 suggests that going from zero to median reform intensity in Britain (2.1) increases
shirking by 5.9 percentage points, a large effect given that shirking is not very common
(the mean rate is 0.08). Strikingly, the coefficient estimate in the attendance model in the
contemporary case is nearly identical to the estimate from our historical case. Model 3 turns
to assessing the effect of the reform on policy responsiveness. The dependent variable is
the first-dimension NOMINATE score (varying from left to right on a scale from -1 to 1)
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and the specification includes mean citizen ideology, which is measured on a left-right scale
from 1 to 10 using the 1994 and 1999 European Election Surveys, and its multiplicative
interaction with reform intensity. The interaction coefficient suggests that reform intensity
significantly increases the rather loose link between citizen left-right ideology and legislative
voting. Altogether, the contemporary evidence is remarkably consistent with the historical
evidence from the more controlled Swiss case.38
Conclusion
Electoral institutions are a crucial feature of representative democracy. Based on a new
theory and fine-grained evidence from the intensive margin of two major electoral reforms,
we have argued that making electoral systems more proportional can have conflicting effects
on political representation. Improving the policy responsiveness of the legislature to the
population at large can come at the cost of reducing the quality of politicians. In the
context of an uneven electoral geography, adopting a form of PR may still make a majority
of voters better off. But the benefit of the reform is smaller than suggested by pure spatial
theories that abstract from the quality dimensions of representation. The theory also implies
that rising political polarization increases the trade-off between policy responsiveness and
quality required by different electoral institutions. Investigating this sobering possibility is
a relevant task for future research.
38Unfortunately, neither case allows us to examine long-run effects due to subsequent institutional change.
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S1 Theoretical model
S1.1 Proof of Proposition 1
We will show that the outcomes in Table 1 are the only equilibrium outcomes given the
electoral geography. Proposition 1 directly follows from this. Recall that a perfectly coalition-
proof equilibrium is robust to any coalitional deviation by voters and politicians that is self-
enforcing. As is discussed by Bernheim, Peleg and Whinston (1987), it is natural to think of
players being able to communicate about possible coalitions during the electoral campaign
but not being able to commit to a particular voting or entry strategy. In the MR model,
this means that each partisan group i in each district d and all 18 politicians can be treated
as the relevant players. In the PR model, each group of voters i can be analyzed as a single
player that may distribute its votes arbitrarily across lists.
Preliminaries Without loss of generality, let us normalize u(|0|) = 0 to reduce notation.
The text states the assumption that voters prefer a parliament that implements their ideal
policy to any parliament that implements the ideal policy of the next closest group in the
policy space and includes one additional high-quality legislator. Formally, this minimal
polarization condition requires that
−u(|xL − xM |) > max{(g(3)− g(2), g(2)− g(1), g(1)− g(0)}.
We refer to it as assumption A1 below. Moreover, given A1, high polarization is formally
defined as
−u(|xL − xM |) > g(3)− g(1)
which we refer to as assumption A2.
For the PR game, let σP = {P ω, P ω, P ω} denote party P ’s list of candidates, characterized
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by fixed partisan type P ∈ {L,M,H} and endogenous quality ω ∈ {0, 1}.
Majority rule First, verify that the following two parliaments are equilibrium outcomes:
{L11,M02 , H13}, {M11 ,M02 ,M13}. Consider {L11,M02 , H13}. By A1, M voters in d=2 cannot
commit to vote against M02 as this would change policy to xL or xH . So M
0
2 enters, blocking
the candidacy of M12 , and wins. M
0
2 prefers the parliament {L11,M02 , H13} to {L11,M12 , H13}
as she obtains private benefits from office pi > c and disregards externalities of her behavior
on g. In contrast, good types L11 (H
1
3 ) in the other districts are able to run because L1 (H3)
voters off the equilibrium path are willing to vote against bad types and support any M type
instead, as this does not change x∗ = xM given what everybody else is doing. There is no
credible coalitional deviation to a Pareto-efficient parliament g(3). Any such deviation has to
ensure that M remains the median party in parliament so that M voters in d=2 are willing to
vote against M02 . Clearly, either L or H voters will be better off reneging from the coalition
to obtain their ideal policy. Next, consider {M11 ,M02 ,M13}. This equilibrium requires that L
voters in d=1 vote for any Lω1 that declares candidacy in their district unless M
1
1 enters and
no other district is electing a L-candidate. Symmetrically, H voters in d=3 vote for any Hω3
that declares candidacy in their district unless M13 enters and no other district is electing
a H-candidate. Given these strategies, M voters in d=2 do not vote against M02 , as doing
so would adversely change policy to xL or xH . Hence, politicians M
1
1 ,M
0
2 ,M
1
3 enter and
get elected, and there are no self-enforcing coalitional deviations to induce a Pareto-efficient
parliament g(3).
Second, there are no other equilibria. There can be no equilibrium that entails x∗ 6= xM .
Suppose otherwise, so that at least two L or two H legislators are elected. By A1, any of the
above equilibria provide a credible coalitional deviation to such an outcome. For instance,
consider {L11, L12, i13}. Then M and H voters and candidates will jointly defect to induce
{L11,M02 , H13}. Moreover, there is no equilibrium where g∗ < g(2) and x∗ = xM . Again, a
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self-enforcing coalition of voters can at least induce parliament {L11,M02 , H13}. Furthermore,
subgame perfection rules out the existence of a Pareto-efficient equilibrium where g∗ = g(3).
Suppose otherwise and let {M11 ,M12 ,M13} be an equilibrium parliament. The entry of M12
requires that, off the equilibrium path, M voters in d = 2 to vote against M02 and for any
L (or H) candidate instead. This is not credible, as the best-response of L voters in d = 1
dictates that they will drop their support for M02 to secure a parliamentary majority for their
preferred policy. The same logic applies to {L11,M12 ,M13} and {M11 ,M12 , H13}. Finally, it is
easy to verify that there are no other equilibria that produce the same x∗ and g∗.
Proportional representation There are two cases. First, suppose A2 holds (high polar-
ization). The following two outcome-equivalent parliaments exist in equilibrium: {L0, L0,M1}
or {L0, L0, H1} (we leave out subscripts for districts as there is only one polity-wide district
under PR). The equilibrium party lists corresponding to the first parliament {L0, L0,M1}
are as follows: σL = {L0, L0, L0}, σM = {M1,M1,M1}, and σH = ∅. By A2, the majority of
L voters prefer the induced outcomes x∗ = xL and g∗ = g(1) to any outcome x∗ 6= xL. Hence
they cannot credibly commit to vote against list σL in which the two top spots are taken by
bad types. As a consequence, all three bad types L0 declare their candidacy, as the chance
of winning office is sufficiently high by assumption (pi/3 > c). The third parliamentary seat,
by contrast, will be taken by a good type of party M . Concerning this last seat, M and
H voters can commit to voting against a list with low-quality candidates as this will not
change the median type in the legislature. As a result, gate keepers in party M allow the
good types to declare candidacy, and by assumption pi/3 > c all of them will enter. The logic
for outcome-equivalent parliament {L0, L0, H1} is symmetric, and the corresponding party
lists are: σL = {L0, L0, L0}, σM = ∅, and σH = {H1, H1, H1}. There are no other equilibria.
A2 rules out any parliament that leads to x∗ 6= xL. A self-enforcing coalition of voters and
politicians can always achieve {L0, L0,M1} or {L0, L0, H1}.
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Second, suppose A2 does not hold (low polarization). Then the equilibrium parliament
is {L0, L1,M1} or {L0, L1, H1}. In equilibrium, party L runs the list σL = {L0, L1, L1}, and
one of the two remaining parties enters with a list full of good types (by pi/3 > c) and the
other stays out. (Mixed strategies are excluded.) By A1, left voters prefer σL, which leads
to x∗ = xL and g∗ = g(2), to any other parliament where L has no majority. As A2 does not
hold, off the equilibrium path they vote against party L with two bad types on the top of the
list, supporting the alternative list with high quality candidates instead. As a result, exactly
one bad type L0 declares candidacy, allowing two good types L1 to enter and compete for
the chance to win the second seat. The second party that enters has incentives to let the
good types run as voters can credibly commit to vote for σL otherwise. It is straightforward
to verify that there are no other equilibria. This completes the proof. 
S1.2 Alternative formalization
The model presented in the text assumes that politicians in a political party make costly
entry decisions and low-quality types are gatekeepers that may block the entry of high-quality
types in the election. An alternative approach to model political recruitment within parties
is to assume that parties – whether a leadership or rank-and-file members – select candidates
subject to the constraint that high quality candidates are costlier, reflecting foregone rents
or opportunity costs to the party or better outside options of the candidates (Galasso and
Nannicini, 2011, 2017). This approach focuses on the allocation decision of the party rather
than the entry decisions of individual politicians and it does not give any special influence to
low-quality politicians. In this section, we show that adopting this alternative formulation
of party organization leads to the same institutional trade-off.
Specifically, let us suppose that each party P ∈ {L,M,H} selects a slate of candidates
for the parliament, denoted by σP = {P ω1 , P ω2 , P ω3 }, where ω = 0 denotes a low-quality and
ω = 1 a high-quality type. Subscripts denote the electoral district under MR and the list
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position under PR. As before, candidate selection takes place simultaneously in all three
parties. Parties care about the policy outcome as well as office and they suffer a cost from
selecting high-quality politicians, which need not be very large. Formally, a party’s utility
function is
UP = u(|x∗ − xP |) + s
(
3∑
d=1
Pd
)
− c
(
3∑
d=1
P 1d
)
.
The first-term on the right-hand side captures policy motivations, the s-term captures the
benefits of winning parliamentary seats beyond the ability to shape policy and the c-term
captures the cost of recruiting high-quality politicians. The cost for nominating a bad politi-
cian is normalized to zero and there are positive marginal costs of selecting a high-quality
type: c(3) > c(2) > c(1) > c(0) = 0. Consistent with evidence that parties do select high-
quality politicians in some contests (Besley et al., 2017; Galasso and Nannicini, 2011), we
assume that the costs are not prohibitive. In particular, assume that the gains of winning
an additional parliamentary seat for sure outweigh the costs of selecting an additional high-
quality candidate. As we will see, in equilibrium this can nonetheless lead to an undersupply
of high-quality politicians.
Proposition 2 states that the equilibrium policy and valence outcome under majority rule
are the same as with the assumption about party organization (i.e., gatekeeping) used in the
main text.
Proposition 2. Assuming the alternative model of party organization, the equilibrium policy
and quality under majority rule are x∗ = xM and quality is g∗ = g(2).
Proof. First, verify that the following parliaments are equilibrium outcomes: {L11,M02 , H13},
{M11 ,M02 ,M13}. Consider the first parliament, {L11,M02 , H13}. It is the result of the fol-
lowing party nomination decisions: σL = {L11, L02, L03}, σM = {M01 ,M02 ,M03}, and σH =
{H01 , H02 , H13}. The median voter in d=1 votes for L1, the median voter in d=2 votes for M0
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and the median voter in d=3 votes for H1. Given the nominated candidates, no group of
voters can benefit from a deviation. By A1, M voters in d=2 cannot commit to vote against
M02 as this would change policy to xL. The best response of party M is to select a low-quality
candidate in the district. In the remaining two districts, however, party L or H nominates
a high-quality candidate because voters are willing to vote against bad types of their party
(off the equilibrium path) and support M0 instead. This threat is subgame perfect as imple-
menting it does not change the policy outcome given what everybody else is doing. Given the
assumed benefits of office outweigh the cost of recruitment, party L (H) in d=1 (d=3) has
incentives to select a high type. There is also no credible coalitional deviation to a Pareto-
efficient parliament g(3), because any feasible coalition is not self-enforcing. Next, consider
the equilibrium generating parliament {M11 ,M02 ,M13}. Voter best responses are identical to
the model with endogenous entry and party nomination decisions are σL = {L01, L02, L03},
σM = {M11 ,M02 ,M13}, and σH = {H01 , H02 , H03}. Given voters’ strategies and what the other
parties are doing, there are no beneficial deviations in the candidate selection stage. Finally,
it can easily be verified that there are no other equilibria. The logic is nearly identical to
the baseline model. 
Proposition 3 summarizes the outcome under PR under the alternative formalization if
polarization is high. (There is no pure strategy equilibrium if A2 does not hold.) Taken
together, Proposition 3 and Proposition 2 imply the same trade-off as in Proposition 1.
Proposition 3. Suppose A2 holds. Assuming the alternative model of party organization,
under proportional representation the equilibrium policy is x∗ = xM and g∗ = g(1).
Proof. Suppose A2 holds (high polarization). The following three outcome-equivalent
parliaments exist in equilibrium: {L0, L0,M1}, {L0, L0, H1}, {L0, L0, L1}. The equilib-
rium party lists corresponding to the first parliament {L0, L0,M1} are as follows: σL =
{L0, L0, L0}, σM = {M1,M0,M0}, and σH = {H0, H0, H0}. L voters vote for σL and the
other voters support σM . By A2, the majority of L voters prefer the induced outcomes
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x∗ = xL and g∗ = g(1) to any outcome x∗ 6= xL. Because they cannot credibly commit to
vote against list σL and given what the other voters are doing, party L has no incentive to
nominate high-quality types. The third parliamentary seat, by contrast, will be taken by
a good type of party M . Voters can commit to voting against a list σ′M = {M0,M0,M0}
as this will not change the median type in the legislature. The logic for outcome-equivalent
parliaments {L0, L0, H1} and {L0, L0, L1} is symmetric. As in the baseline PR model, there
are no other equilibria. 
S1.3 Majority rule with multi-member districts
In the main text we argue that the theory also applies to majority rule with multi-member
electoral districts, such as the Swiss case we study in the empirical part of the paper. To
illustrate how the institutional logic works in this situation, consider a 7-member parliament.
As depicted in Table S1.1, let us assume that there are seven different municipalities of
equal population size, denoted by letters a to g. In the majoritarian system, there are two
multi-member districts (consisting of three and two municipalities, respectively) and two
single-member districts (each comprising a single municipality). This means that a majority
of seats under MR is allocated in multi-member districts. As in the baseline model, electoral
geography is unequal such that the median in the population (L) is not the median in
the median district. L voters are heavily concentrated in three-member district d = 1, H
voters are concentrated in single-member districts d= 3, 4 and M voters are the median
in the remaining two-member district. The specific distribution of voters within and across
districts in Table S1.1 is for concreteness but not required for the argument. Under MR, a
voter casts a vote for each seat to be filled in her district. There is no cumulation of votes and
a candidate with at least the support of half the voters wins. If fewer candidates than there
are seats obtain an absolute majority, the winner for any outstanding seat is determined in
a second round using first-past-the post among the top candidates who did not obtain a seat
9
Table S1.1: Example with multi-member districts under majority rule
Municipality Electoral Voters (fraction in each district)
district L M H
a 1 0.9 0.1 0.0
b 1 0.9 0.1 0.0
c 1 0.9 0.1 0.0
d 2 0.45 0.4 0.15
e 2 0.45 0.4 0.15
f 3 0.2 0.2 0.6
g 4 0.0 0.15 0.85
Population size 0.54 0.21 0.25
in the first round. Under PR, there is a polity-wide district. While not necessary for the
argument, it simplifies the analysis to assume that voters who are indifferent over outcomes
simply support the ideologically closest candidate(s) or party list.
Consider a situation with high polarization (A2).1 Given the equilibrium concept, the
outcome under majority rule is x∗ = xM and g∗ = g(6) and the outcome under PR is
x∗ = xL and g∗ = g(3). Qualitatively, this implies the same institutional effect captured by
the simpler model (Proposition 1): Compared to PR, majority rule is worse at representing
the policy preferences of the population at large but better at selecting good politicians.
In the MR game, it is easy to verify that the following political behavior constitutes an
equilibrium: in district 1, three type-L1 politicians enter and win; in district 2, one M0 and
one M1 candidate enters and wins; in districts 3 and 4, H1 politicians enter and win. As
a result, the median legislator will be from the M party, leading to x = xM and g = g(6).
1Given the increased size of the parliament compared to the baseline model, the equivalent high polar-
ization assumption is that −u(|xL − xM |) > g(7)− g(3).
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As in the baseline model, M voters in d=2 cannot credibly commit to vote against two M0-
candidates as this would change policy to xL or xH given what voters in the other districts
are doing. However, they can coordinate to credibly vote for one high quality candidate of
party H as this will not change the legislative median but improve policy, thus providing
incentives for the entry of one M1-candidate. In the other districts, good types are selected
because voters can vote on quality without changing the partisan identity of the median
legislator. Entry decisions follow and all MPs are elected in the first round. As in the
baseline model, there is no credible coalitional deviation to a Pareto-efficient parliament
g(7). Other outcomes x 6= xM or g < g(6) cannot occur in equilibrium, as a self-enforcing
coalition of voters can always induce x = xM and g = g(6).
In the PR game, the equilibrium parliament will consist of four L0 MPs and three high-
quality MPs from at least one other party. If indifferent voters support the list of the
ideologically closest party and given group sizes in Table S1.1, the unique equilibrium parlia-
ment is {L0, L0, L0, L0,M1, H1, H1}. A2 implies that L voters prefer the induced outcomes
x∗ = xL and g∗ = g(3) to any outcome x∗ 6= xL and so politicians of the L party have no
incentives to compete on good politicians, in contrast to the other parties.
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S2 Data
This appendix provides additional information on the data used in the Swiss case. Table S2.2
reports summary statistics and sources for the variables used in the main analysis reported
in Table 3. Recall that the unit of analysis varies with the dependent variable. It is MP-vote
in columns 1-3, district-vote in column 4, and MP-parliament in columns 5-7. Descriptive
statistics in Table S2.2 are based on the MP-parliament dataset except for the congruence
variables.
Note that descriptives for reform intensity cover both the pre-reform and the post-reform
parliament. However, between districts in the post-reform parliament median reform inten-
sity is 1.1 (mentioned in the text and underlying Figure 2) and mean reform intensity is
1.07.
Table S2.3 lists the cantonal referendums matched to roll-call votes for the analysis of con-
gruence, including a short description of each issue and summary statistics for district-level
referendum outcomes.2 Referendum results were retrieved from the cantonal database on
election and referendums available at http://www.wahlen-abstimmungen.zh.ch/internet/
justiz_inneres/wahlen-abstimmungen/de/abstimmungen/abstimmungsarchiv.html Par-
liamentary votes are coded from the parliamentary records (Kantonsrat, 1917, 1920). It is
noteworthy that the analysis includes key economic issues (tax reform or working time regu-
lation) and constitutional issues (electoral reform or reform of legislative institutions) before
and after the reform. The mean level of support varies considerably across policies. More-
over, there is large variation in policy preferences across districts, which is a strong indication
of political polarization. The cross-sectional range in the yes-vote share is always larger than
30 percentage points and on several key issues it is twice as large. As indicated in the table,
there are large differences between rural and urban districts. But there also is considerable
2The mean support across districts does not correspond to the overall yes-vote (%) in the population
because districts, the unit of analysis, vary in size.
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variation between urban districts (e.g., there is 31-point gap between Zu¨rich 1 and Zu¨rich
2 on electoral reform or a 16-point gap between Winterthur and Zu¨rich 2 on working time
regulation).
Table S2.4 compares referenda with matched to roll-call votes, listed in Table S2.3, with
referenda for which there is no roll-call vote. This reveals that referenda with corresponding
roll-call votes are fairly similar on key observational features – whether the referendum is
mandatory, turnout and the yes-vote share – to those without roll-call votes. Matched
referenda are somewhat more contested, though the difference is not statistically significant,
and have a slightly higher (by three percentage points) turnout.
Finally, Figure S2.1 plots the municipality-level vote share in the referendum to adopt
PR. At a more fine-grained level, it illustrates the large variation in mass support for the
reform.
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Table S2.4: Comparing matched to non-matched referendums
No roll call Roll call
Mean Mean Difference
(p value)
Mandatory referendum 0.74 0.80 0.06
(0.80)
Turnout referendum 0.72 0.75 -0.03
(0.04)
Yes vote referendum 0.68 0.54 0.14
(0.22)
N 27 5
Notes: Referendum data are from the Abstimmungsarchiv of the canton Zu¨rich
and information on roll calls is from the parliamentary records of the Kanton-
srat.
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Overall support = 0.53
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Figure S2.1: Referendum on introduction of PR in December 1916
Notes: Each observation is a municipality (politische Gemeinde). There are 187 municipalities in the canton.
They vary in population size. The city of Zu¨rich, which is one municipality, is split up into its contempo-
raneous electoral districts. Data are from the cantonal referendum database (Abstimmungsarchiv) and the
Statistical Yearbook of the city of Zu¨rich for 1916.
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S3 Additional empirical results
S3.1 Measuring the quality of politicians
In the paper, we explain why regular attendance taps into the quality of politicians con-
cerning their integrity or internal motivation (also see Fisman et al., 2015; Gagliarducci,
Nannicini and Naticchioni, 2011; Høyland, Hobolt and Hix, 2017). In this section, we pro-
vide supporting evidence for this claim showing that attendance is positively related to MPs’
reelection rate as well their speechmaking. Moreover, we report results using speeches and
education as the dependent variable. The latter taps into a separate aspect of quality relat-
ing to competence. These analyses confirm the findings based on attendance. Finally, we
consider local political experience as an attribute that features prominently in personal vote
theories of electoral institutions.
Reelection. As previewed in the measurement section of the paper, Appendix Table S3.1
shows that MPs’ attendance is a statistically and substantively relevant predictor of whether
they are reelected. This auxiliary analysis focuses on the two pre-reform parliaments elected
under majority rule (1911-1914 and 1914-1917) to avoid confounding the relationship with the
subsequent electoral reform. The dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 if an incumbent
MP from the 1911-1914 parliament (Kantonsrat) is reelected in the 1914 election and 0
otherwise, and we estimate linear probability models. The sample includes all MPs that did
not exit parliament before the end of the term. For ease of interpretation, attendance has
been z-standardized (i.e., mean 0 and unit standard deviation).
The specifications reported in Appendix Table S3.1 start with a simple regression model
that only includes attendance and subsequently adds electoral district fixed effects for the
53 electoral districts in the majoritarian system and a vector of MP characteristics (local
political experience, education, member of national parliament, age, worker, farmer). As in
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the main analysis, adding MP characteristics leads to a small decline in sample size due to
missing biographical information for replacement MPs. The sign and size of the coefficient
on attendance is robust across specifications and statistically significant at the five percent
level except in model 2, where p = 0.05. Substantively, the estimate from column (3) in
Table S3.1 suggests that one standard deviation increase in attendance is related to a 10
percentage point increase, on average, in the probability of reelection. This corresponds to
a 12 percent increase relative to the mean reelection rate of 0.83. This finding is robust to
excluding politicians aged 68 and above (model 4), who may be more likely to attend less
and seek reelection due to health reasons or retirement.
These results support the claim that attendance is a signal of valence that mattered to
parties at the time. They are consistent with partisan selection based on quality, though from
the data we cannot verify this directly. It can also be that MPs planning to exit parliament
slack off systematically. Either way, attendance is clearly linked to parliamentary careers.
It is also noteworthy that the positive relationship between attendance and reelection
is not restricted to single-member or low-magnitude districts. Model (5) excludes single-
member and binomial districts. It produces a virtually identical coefficient estimate. Fur-
thermore, Model 6 includes a multiplicative interaction term between attendance and (log
of) district magnitude. Estimates based on this interactive specification indicate that while
the relationship is most pronounced in small districts and becomes weaker as district mag-
nitude increases, the slope of the interaction term is not very steep. As is illustrated by the
marginal effects plot in Figure S3.1, there is a positive and statistically significant relation-
ship between attendance and reelection even in large districts with a magnitude up to about
14. To put this in perspective, in the post-reform districted PR system the median district
magnitude is 10. We interpret this as indirect evidence that informational issues do not rule
out selection based on quality in multi-member districts.
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Table S3.1: Parliamentary participation and reelection
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Attendance 0.07 0.07 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.32
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.09)
Attendance × -0.10
District magn. (log) (0.04)
District FE X X X X X
MP characteristics X X X X
Observations 221 221 208 190 177 208
Notes: Dependent variable: a dummy equal to 1 if an MP from 1911-1914 cantonal parlia-
ment is reelected in 1914 election and 0 otherwise. Estimation is by OLS. Standard errors
in parentheses are clustered by electoral district (53 clusters). The sample includes all MPs
that did not exit parliament before the end of the term. Mean reelection rate: 0.83. For
ease of interpretation, attendance has been z-standardized. Model (4) excludes MPs aged
67 and above. Model (5) excludes all districts with a district magnitude of 1 or 2. Note
that in the interactive specification of model (6), the constituent term for district magni-
tude is absorbed by the district fixed effects. MP characteristics: local political experience,
education, member of national parliament, age, worker, farmer.
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Figure S3.1: Parliamentary attendance and reelection
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Note: The figure displays the marginal effect of (standardized) parliamentary attendance on the
reelection probability conditional on logged district magnitude from Table S3.1, model 3, with 95%
confidence intervals. In the bottom, markers p1,p25,...,p99 indicate percentiles of the empirical
distribution of the conditioning variable.
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Speeches. Appendix Table S3.2 reports additional results about the conditional relation-
ship between parliamentary attendance and speeches. A negative count model finds a pos-
itive and significant relationship. This is consistent with evidence from other settings cited
in the paper and further bolsters the argument that attendance is a useful proxy for MPs’
parliamentary effort.
Appendix Table S3.3 presents results from an analysis using the number of legislative
speeches in key debates as the outcome variable. Key debates concern the votes used in
the congruence analysis. While speeches have been used before in the literature as a proxy
for legislative effort, one may be concerned that agenda control limits their usefulness (e.g.,
Proksch and Slapin, 2012; Schwarz, Traber and Benoit, 2017). However, this concern is
minimized in the cantonal parliament we study. The speaking agenda is open. Any member
of parliament may take the floor in a particular debate. The parliamentary rules guarantee
that even if a majority votes to end a debate, any member who has not yet spoken on the
issue has the right to take the floor. Given the nature of the dependent variable, we estimate
a negative-binomial count model that allows for overdispersion in the speech counts. To
capture heterogeneity across debates, the model allows for random variation in the dispersion
parameter by debate. In addition to the usual co-variates, the model includes a dummy for
the rapporteur in a given debate. The estimation results indicate a significant negative effect
of reform intensity.
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Table S3.2: Parliamentary attendance and speeches
(1) (2) (3)
Parliamentary attendance 2.17 2.88 4.02
(0.97) (1.13) (1.37)
Education 0.86
(0.60)
District controls X X X
MP characteristics X X
Observations 204 203 203
Notes: Dependent variable: number of speeches given by MP in key debates
in the pre-reform parliamentary term (Kantonsrat 1914-1917). Key debates
concern the votes used in the congruence analysis. The table shows the results
from a negative-binomial count model, which allows for overdispersion, esti-
mating the relationship between parliamentary attendance and parliamentary
speeches. Standard errors are in parentheses. MPs exiting early or entering
late and the president of parliament, who does not participate in debates, are
excluded. District controls and MP characteristics are the same as in the main
analysis. Education is a dummy for PhD.
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Table S3.3: Electoral reform and parliamentary speeches
(1) (2) (3)
Reform intensity -0.44 -0.48 -0.50
(0.21) (0.22) (0.23)
District controls X X X
District FE X X
MP characteristics X
Observations 1,053 1,053 1,051
Notes: Dependent variable: total number of speeches given by MP in a
key debate. The table shows the results from a negative-binomial count
model that allows for random variation in the dispersion parameter by
debate. Standard errors are in parentheses. MPs exiting early or entering
late are excluded. District controls and MP characteristics are the same
as in the main analysis plus a dummy for the rapporteur. In addition,
model (3) includes a dummy for the rapporteur.
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Education. Appendix Table S3.4 repeats the analysis with educational attainment as the
dependent variable. While our focus is on politicians’ motivation and integrity, education
taps into the competence dimension of politicians’ quality that has been the subject of sev-
eral existing studies of institutions and selection (Besley and Reynal-Querol, 2011; Galasso
and Nannicini, 2011). Ultimately, both aspects of quality are important for representation.
Theoretical models typically assume that quality is one dimensional and they can be inter-
preted as either competence or integrity, though in the real-world these aspects may not go
hand in hand and the effects of electoral institutions may vary across different dimensions of
quality. One concern with education in the literature is that it confounds social background
with competence, which may be especially relevant before the mass expansion of tertiary
education after World War II in Europe, and the assumption that politicians with more for-
mal education are more competent leaders is subject to empirical controversy (Carnes and
Lupu, 2016). However, the recruitment of highly educated politicians was not a strategy
exclusive to established parties. Social Democrats also recruited politicians with high formal
education. As a result, one can argue that education is a meaningful proxy in this historical
setting as well that can shed light on the logic of political recruitment under alternative
institutions.
Given our biographical data, we code whether an MP has a doctoral degree (most fre-
quently in law or medicine, but also in arts and sciences). This is the case for 14.7% of MPs
in the pre-reform parliament. Using this binary variable for educational attainment as the
dependent variable, we find evidence that the electoral reform tends to be linked to decline
in the selection of highly educated MPs, though the effect is not statistically significant in all
specifications. To the extent that these types have higher opportunity costs, this is broadly
consistent with the theoretical logic.
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Table S3.4: Electoral reform and education of MPs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Reform intensity -0.06 -0.04 -0.06 -0.04 -0.05
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.05)
District controls X X X X X
District FE X X X
Varying trends X
Observations 491 491 723 723 723
Notes: Dependent variable: a dummy variable indicating if MP has a doctoral
degree (14.7 % in pre-reform parliament). Models 3-5 adds the 1911-1914
parliamentary term. Estimation is by OLS. Standard errors in parentheses are
clustered at level of post-reform electoral districts. District controls are the
same as in main specification.
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Local experience. Building on earlier personal vote theories of electoral institutions, re-
cent contributions in this literature focus on how electoral rules shape the political selection
of candidates with local attributes through strategic decisions by parties and candidates.
Previous local political experience or birthplace have been used in recent studies (Nemoto
and Shugart, 2013; Shugart, Valdini and Suominen, 2005). As discussed in the main text,
we think of these theories as complementary to our theoretical argument. Quality construed
in our framework as motivation to contribute to broader parliamentary activities does not
inherently favor local over national projects. Our main behavioral measures reflect this focus.
It is nonetheless useful to examine local attributes of MPs. While data on birthplace is not
available for most of our MPs, we have calculated a dummy variable indicating if an MP has
political experience at the local level (e.g., council member or elected administrative office).
The theoretical expectation here is more ambiguous than that for attendance, speechmaking
or congruence. Our model does not predict that reform intensity is related to the localness
of MPs. Theories of the personal vote suggest that a higher dosage of PR should lead to
reduced incentives to rely on local attributes if voters do not choose between candidates
of the same party (Carey and Shugart, 1995; Shugart, Valdini and Suominen, 2005). De
facto, most but not all voters cast straight party votes in the open-list PR election we study.
However, there are some preference voters, which muddies the prediction - but from this
perspective the same should be true for our other outcome variables. Table S3.5 reports the
estimation results. They show that while the sign of reform intensity is consistently nega-
tive, the effect is imprecisely estimated (i.e., never significant at the 5 percent level). This
strengthens the interpretation that our findings do not simply reflect the local vs. national
trade-off discussed in the personal vote literature.
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Table S3.5: Electoral reform and local political experience
(1) (2) (3)
Reform intensity -0.06 -0.05 -0.06
(0.04) (0.04) (0.03)
District controls X X X
District FE X X
MP characteristics X
Observations 491 491 462
Notes: Dependent variable: a dummy variable indicating if MP has
local-level political experience. Estimation is by OLS. Standard errors
in parentheses are clustered at level of post-reform electoral districts.
District controls are the same as in main specification.
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S3.2 Further robustness checks
As discussed in the robustness section of the paper, Appendix Table S3.6 shows that the
results reported in the main text are robust to alternative ways of operationalizing the out-
come variables or electoral institutions as well as to relaxing the parallel trends assumption.
Concerning the analysis of MP-voter congruence, one may ask how accounting for absten-
tions and absent MPs changes the results. So far, the analysis has excluded these cases. One
may be concerned that the positive effect of reform intensity masks strategic non-decisions
by MPs in districts that were exposed to a larger increase in district magnitude, thus over-
stating policy responsiveness. To assess this possibility in a straightforward way, column 1
codes all MPs that abstained or were absent on the day of the vote as having cast a vote
dissonant with the popular vote. If the problem is relevant, this re-coding should produce a
significantly diminished effect. To also allow for the opposite possibility, column 2 codes ab-
stainers or absentees as having cast a congruent vote. In either case, the procedure increases
the number of observations, but it does not meaningfully alter the results. The coefficient
on reform intensity remains large and significant in each specification.
Furthermore, column 3 takes an alternative approach to capture the institutional environ-
ment faced by a particular MP. In this specification, the reform intensity variable is dropped.
Instead, the model includes the (log) district magnitude in a given district d and electoral
term t. Given the inclusion of post-reform district fixed effects, the main variation also comes
from varying exposure to the electoral reform across districts, and hence the interpretation is
similar to our main specification. A difference is that this alternative specification measures
the pre-reform district magnitude at a lower level of pre-reform districts rather than using
the average at the level of post-reform districts. A drawback is that it makes a separability
assumption concerning the effect of district magnitude and the introduction of the PR voting
rule, and the latter cannot be distinguished from a general time trend. Reassuringly, the
results from this alternative specification confirm our main results.
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Turning to the analysis of parliamentary attendance, one issue is that both selection
based on integrity and reelection incentives may shape MPs’ attendance behavior. If reelec-
tion motives are dominant, the effect of reform intensity should be less pronounced when the
dependent variable excludes the latter part of the term leading up to the next election. Stud-
ies of retrospective voting based on the economy suggest that voters’ evaluation are heavily
skewed toward the last 2-4 quarters before the election (Achen and Bartels 2016, ch. 6; Healy
and Lenz 2014). Following this logic, column 4 excludes the last year before the election in
the calculation of MPs’ attendance rate. Qualitatively, the results are unchanged. Though
the effect of reform intensity is about one-third larger. This bolsters the interpretation that
parliamentary attendance captures variation in quality of MPs rather than reelection incen-
tives. Column 5 employs the alternative institutional measure, (log) district magnitude, in
the attendance regression. Again, this check confirms the main results.
Finally, column 6 includes attendance data from the 1911-14 parliamentary term and
so the analysis covers three terms. This allows us to control for varying time trends and
to test for the existence of pre-treatment trends (Angrist and Pischke, 2009), and doing so
confirms our previous results. (Recall that data limitations restrict this test to parliamentary
attendance.) The specification includes time trends that vary by the subsequent exposure to
the reform. Specifically, four dummy variables based on the ratio of post-reform to pre-reform
district magnitude, approximately corresponding to the four quartiles of the distribution, are
interacted with a linear time trend. In addition, column 7 adds a variable that switches on
reform intensity during the 1911-14 parliamentary term and sets it to zero otherwise. This
is a natural way to assess the existence of pre-treatments trends. The resulting coefficient
is small and not statistically significant. This bolsters the validity of our empirical strategy.
In contrast, the reform intensity coefficient is substantively and statistically significant. It is
about one-third larger than in the baseline specification.
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Additional aggregate level results. Going beyond the district-level results reported in
column 4 of Table 3 in the main text, Table S3.7 reports additional aggregate-level results
base on other district-level measures of policy representation. They confirm the results on
the congruence dimension of representation. Columns 1-3 of Table S3.7 use the average
congruence of MPs in the district on a given issue. This is simply the aggregate version
of the dependent variable in the micro-level specification. This serves to show that the
main findings from the individual-level analysis are not sensitive to the level of analysis.
Following a suggestion from an anonymous reviewer, specifications 4-6 use an alternative
measure defined as the average popular support minus the average legislative support on a
given issue in a district. We take the absolute value of this difference, creating something
approximating a distance measure. Given the scale of the dependent variable, we should
observe a negative effect of the reform (i.e., a declining gap between voters and politicians
on average). This is what we find and the reform intensity coefficient is significant at the 10
percent level in column 6 (p = 0.068). Note that a previous version of this table mistakenly
reported results in columns 4-6 that measured % Voters - % MPs without taking the absolute
value.
Table S3.7: Additional aggregate-level results: effect of reform intensity on other district-
level measures of policy representation
Average Congruence Absolute difference:
% Voters - % MPs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Reform 0.22 0.22 0.17 -0.02 -0.022 -0.065
intensity 0.084 (0.080) (0.099) (0.022) (0.020) (0.033)
District FE X X X X
District controls X X X X
Observations 90 90 90 90 90 90
Notes: All models include vote fixed effects. District controls are the same as in Table 3.
Estimation is by OLS. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at level of post-reform
electoral districts.
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S3.3 Heterogeneity
Excluding the city of Zu¨rich. At the local level, the city of Zu¨rich had adopted PR in
1913, four years before it was introduced at the cantonal level. This means that some voters
and some politicians in the canton were more familiar with the new system than others.
(During the campaign to introduce PR at the cantonal level, the recent city-level reform
was cited by proponents as proof that PR works.) Moreover, the city of Zu¨rich was also
characterized by the highest population density in the canton (1469 per square km compared
to the canton average of 291). While district fixed effects pick up such heterogeneity across
Bezirke in the main analysis, one may ask whether the results are driven by the city with its
(slightly) longer experience with PR or its dense population. While this considerably reduces
the size of the sample, we can exclude the city of Zu¨rich from the analysis to address this
point. Results are reported in Table S3.8. They show that the estimates are very similar to
the ones using the full sample.
Pre-reform district magnitude. Table S3.9 examines whether the effect of reform in-
tensity varies by the pre-reform level of district magnitude. Following canonical arguments
about the declining marginal effect of district magnitude on seats-votes disproportionality
(e.g., Rae, 1967), one may conjecture that the effects of the reform on representation are less
pronounced for districts with a larger pre-reform district magnitude (mostly urban areas in
this case). To assess this possibility, Appendix Table S3.9 reports results from OLS mod-
els that interact reform intensity with the (average) level of pre-reform district magnitude.
The results are mixed. For MP-voter congruence as the dependent variable, there is some
evidence that the impact of reform intensity is less pronounced where district magnitude
was already quite high. In all models, the interaction term is significant at the 10 percent
level. For attendance as the dependent variable, there is no evidence of a varying effect of
reform intensity. The slope on the multiplicative interaction term has the “wrong” sign, is
33
substantively small and not significant at any conventional level.
As an additional check, columns (4) and (8) exclude the smallest electoral districts, which
does not change the results. This precludes the possibility that the effects are driven only
by the low-magnitude districts.
One explanation for these patterns may be that while there is considerable variation in
reform intensity, district magnitude increased by at least six seats in the smallest pre-reform
electoral districts, effectively smoothing over the steepest part of the seats-votes curve.
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S3.4 Exploring mechanisms
The analysis reported in Appendix Table S3.10 shows that the effects are robust to controlling
for political experience. We control for two aspects of MPs’ prior political experience: (i) A
dummy variable indicating if an MP has political experience at the local level (e.g., council
member or elected administrative office). (ii) The number of years the MP has served in
the cantonal parliament until the beginning of the current term (seniority). Clearly, adding
either or both variables does not affect the results. The results are also robust to allowing
seniority to have a curve-linear effect (not shown). Consistent with the finding that higher
reform intensity does not lead to a consistent decline in the selection of MPs with previous
political experience, these findings rule out that the effect of the reform is mechanically
driven by supply-constrained parties that cannot find enough high-quality candidates.
Combined with the use of party fixed effects in extended specifications in the paper, these
additional results also rule out the explanation that the reform effect on attendance is driven
by fixed differences across parties, such as lower attendance of farmers due their occupational
demands during harvest. To bolster this point descriptively, Figure S3.2 provides boxplots
for parliamentary attendance by political party for the 1917-1920 term. It shows that average
attendance is very similar for members of bourgeois parties, Social Democrats or the Farmer’s
Party. Mean attendance is highest among the Farmer’s Party, though this small difference
is not statistically significant at the five percent level.
Beyond ruling out these alternative channels, note that the evidence is broadly consistent
with the implication of the argument that political selection of politicians based on parti-
sanship and quality constitute an important channel through which electoral institutions
influence representation. Given the geographic concentration of left voters in industrialized
areas, the introduction of PR went hand in hand with a nearly twofold increase of the seats
won by Social Democrats from 20.7% to 38.1%. The left saw a moderate increase in its
overall vote share from 34.2% to 39.8%, which stems in part from an extension of competi-
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tion to districts previously not contested. Overall, the increase in seats was mainly due to a
more proportional translation of votes into seats. Both channels occur in the model. With
the reform, the left’s votes-seats-ratio drops from 1.65 to 1.04 – changing from significant
underrepresentation to near-perfect proportionality. This is in line with the theoretical logic
and it reflects the hopes and fears of contemporary politicians. For instance, a leading Social
Democratic party newspaper saw in the disproportional votes-seats translation in the 1914
election a“cry for proportional representation,”and it calculated that, even holding the num-
ber of candidates and distribution of votes constant, the party would increase its seat share
by more than 50%.3 A regression analysis reported in Appendix Table S3.11 shows that
left MPs are more congruent, on average, with the cantonal median voter than other MPs
before and after the reform. This suggests that changing the partisan color of parliament
matters substantively, not just descriptively. In addition to the increasing representation of
the Social Democrats, the new Farmers’ Party won 11% of the seats.
Appendix Table S3.11 reports the results of an additional implication of the model con-
cerning the institution-varying relationship between political parties and the quality of their
MPs. The theory posits that the quality of politicians is not inherently different across polit-
ical parties. Electoral institutions shape the incentives of parties to select good politicians.
The argument implies that there is an institution-varying correlation between the partisan
color and quality of politicians. Under MR elected L types have higher quality than the
average. Recall that relevant equilibrium parliament is {L11,M02 , H13}. Under PR, this is
no longer the case and the reverse can occur. The reason is not limited supply of good
politicians. All parties could in principle run a full list of good types. Rather, it reflects the
varying abilities of voters to credibly commit to vote against bad politicians of their most-
preferred party. In line with this auxiliary implication we find that, on average, left MPs
have significantly better attendance records than other MPs before the reform, controlling
3Gru¨tlianer (Zu¨rich), April 27, 1914, p. 1.
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for MPs’ socio-demographic characteristics. This attendance premium disappears after the
reform.
Table S3.10: Effect of electoral reform on political representation controlling for local political
experience and seniority in cantonal parliament
Congruence Attendance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Reform intensity 0.21 0.21 0.21 -0.057 -0.057 -0.057
(0.066) (0.065) (0.066) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Local political -0.34 -0.04 -0.002 -0.002
experience (0.021) (0.020) (0.021) (0.021)
Parl. seniority 0.001 0.002 -0.000 -0.000
(years) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
District controls X X X X X X
District FE X X X X X X
MP char. X X X X X X
Observations 864 864 864 450 450 450
Notes: Dependent variable: congruence between MP and cantonal median voter (models 1-3);
parliamentary attendance (models 4-6). Estimation is by OLS. Standard errors in parentheses
are clustered at level of post-reform electoral districts. All congruence models include vote fixed
effects. District controls and MP characteristics are the same as in main specification (Table 3).
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Figure S3.2: Attendance in 1917-1920 parliament by party affiliation
Notes: Boxplots by party. Mean attendance is 0.87.
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S4 Contemporary Analysis
Table S4.1 summarizes the variables and their sources for the analysis of electoral reform in
the European Parliament. As noted in the text, the analysis focuses on the last parliament
elected under the old rules (1994-1999) and the first post-reform parliament (1999-2004).
The reason is that in 1994 many British districts were redrawn and in 2004 enlargement
significantly altered the composition of the European Parliament. Note that 91% of all pre-
reform districts are perfectly nested in post-reform districts, and the remaining cases are
allocated mostly to one post-reform district, with the exception of Staffordshire East and
Derby, which is dropped from the analysis.
Electoral rules are coded based on the European Parliamentary Elections Act of 1999
(UK) and comparative reports (European Parliament Directorate General for Research, 1997,
1999). As explained in the paper and listed in Table S4.1, all three outcome variables are
calculated from Hix, Noury and Roland (2007), which provide data on all recorded legislative
votes. Their database does not include identifiers for electoral districts, which are needed
for our analysis. We matched MEPs to their districts based on election data.
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Table S4.1: Descriptive statistics for analysis of electoral reform in European Parliament
Mean SD Min Max Source
Reform intensity 0.13 0.50 0 2.40 Coded based on European
Parliamentary Elections Act
of 1999 (UK), available at
http://www.legislation.gov.
uk/ukpga/1999/1/pdfs/ukpga_
19990001_en.pdf, and com-
parative reports from European
Parliament Directorate General
for Research (1997, 1999).
Attendance 0.69 0.21 0.00 1.00 Calculated from data compiled
by Hix, Noury and Roland
(2007), available at http:
//personal.lse.ac.uk/hix/
HixNouryRolandEPdata.HTM
Shirking 0.08 0.09 0.00 0.67 Same as above.
NOMINATE
(first dimension)
0.10 0.50 -0.92 0.93 Same as above.
Mean citizen ide-
ology
5.14 0.28 4.72 5.98 European Election Study 1994
and 1999 (Schmitt et al., 1997;
Eijk et al., 1999).
Notes: includes MEPs in the 4th and 5th European Parliament (N=1,426). In the 4th term,
there is no survey data on citizen ideology for Austria, Finland and Sweden (102 cases).
When estimating NOMINATE scores, Hix, Noury and Roland (2007) dropped MEPs who
participated in less than 20 roll-call votes (25 cases, 3 without survey data).
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